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Introduction
In philosophy, there are generally two ways in which a project can seem
ridiculous at its outset. There are certain philosophical inquiries that initially seem
laughable in the complexity of their telos – Hegel’s Phenomenology of Geist, towards
‘Absolute Knowing,’ serves as a good example. But on the other hand, there are also
philosophical inquiries that initially seem laughable in the simplicity of their telos –
texts that seek to define a concept that seems so near to us, so seemingly obvious, that
any inquiry whatsoever into that concept’s nature seems gratuitous. The initial
inquiries into the nature of language, for instance, must have appeared to be ludicrous
at first – language is one of those things that most people assume to just know.
This project is one of the latter types of inquiries – it seeks to ask a question that
very few people ever think to ask: what, exactly, is a doctor? Even within the field of
the philosophy of medicine, this question is almost never raised – thinkers are too tied
up with ethical dilemmas and questions about the nature of scientific evidence to ask
the glaring question at hand. I haven’t been able to find a reason why this question is
never addressed. It certainly seems to me like an extraordinarily important issue – and
hopefully, at the end of this discussion, the reader will agree. It seems that the
physician, or anyone at that, must fully understand his project in order to carry it out
effectively.
Hence, the telos of this project is twofold – in Part I, I will attempt to solidify the
goal of the physician in medical practice, and in Part II, I will examine the specific ways
by which the doctor can actualize that goal. In other words, the central questions are:
1) What is the goal of the physician? and 2) How is the physician to accomplish or
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actualize that goal? At first glance, the project seems incredibly simple – the doctor is
supposed to make you healthy, and he is to accomplish this through medicine. It seems
that all people have an inherent understanding of health – that health should be a
simple concept that we just know. However, this is certainly not the case.
But rather than try to complicate the seemingly simple nature of the discussion
before it starts, the movement of this project seeks to embrace it. That is, the
organization of the paper is based around deep explorations of the natural assumptions
about medicine. Hence, the discussion of health will be used as a jumping-off point, as
it were, for the examination of the goal of the physician in medicine – health is what the
physician seems to strive towards. In Section 1, five different preexisting notions of
health will be explored, in order to orient us in our project. In Section 2, the underlying
philosophical issues of Section 1 will be explicated, bringing us to a fuller, more
theoretically grounded notion of what the physician is, or should be, striving towards in
the practice of medicine.
Once we have a firm grasp on the goal of the physician, we will move into the
second part of the project, exploring how the physician is supposed to move towards
this newly-understood goal. The obvious movement here is to suggest that the doctor
will achieve his goal through medicine. Again, we will allow what seems apparent and
natural to guide our discussion. Section 3, then, will examine the two most common
medical paradigms in an attempt to explore how systematized medicine can serve as a
way for the physician to accomplish his goal. And finally, Section 4 will attempt to
elaborate upon, or specify, the way the doctor is to accomplish his goal by examining
the specific clinical interaction. At the conclusion of these four sections, the hope is
that a clear notion of the physician’s project – both what it is and how it is to be
5

	
  
accomplished – will be derived.
I also want to note that it was originally my intention to clearly explain the
importance of this analysis of medicine, but I believe it will hold more weight to the
reader if he or she comes to see this importance for his or her self, by means of the
movement through the sections. I will note, however, that it is a secondary goal of this
project to illuminate how incredibly important it is to examine medicine
philosophically. I will not say more, and I will not give a blatant reason as to why, but I
do want the reader to be aware of this as he or she moves through each section.
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Part I: Establishing the Goal of the Physician

Section 1: The Common Notions of Health
Although it seems natural to assume that establishing health in the patient is the
ultimate goal of the physician, a complete idea of health is not so easily defined.
Without an in-depth analysis, it seems that health is a simple concept that is easily
understood in a descriptive way. Because so many specific maladies of the human body
are named, isolated, and spoken about so plainly and clearly in the context of health,
most people in contemporary American society have become accustomed to defining
health against a malady or negative bodily condition. That is, because it has become
the norm in our culture to seek medical counsel only (for the most part) in the event
that we have a specific plight or complaint, we have come to understand the concepts of
health and disease in an antonymous way. For most Americans, health is the opposite
of, or more specifically the absence of, disease - health is generally viewed as our
baseline state of being, and disease is understood as a specific imposition upon that
state. Even the Webster definition supports this assertion - with regard to the human
body, health is simply defined as ‘the condition of being well or free from disease.’
But when the question of the notion of health is addressed more directly and
explicitly, it becomes exceedingly complicated. Health reveals itself as a concept that is
open for very extensive debate, giving rise to a plentitude of analyses and assertions
about a correct understanding. The latter quarter of the twentieth century has given
rise to an extremely intense discussion regarding the nature of health and its meaning
amongst philosophers and medical professionals alike, resulting in a compilation of
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several very specific definitions. Although the scope of this project will not allow me to
address all of these specific claims, I do hope to arrive at a definition of health that is
useful for the sake of examining the interaction between the physician and patient.
What we hope to do here is establish a practical basis for the understanding of the telos
of medical practice, upon which we can build the rest of the discussion.
This does not mean that a specific definition needs to be realized, but rather,
that the practical implications of health, in terms of medicine, need to be explored. It is
because of this that I choose to organize the discussion according to what I perceive to
be five definitions of health that are linguistically non-philosophical - ‘layman’s’
definitions of health, so to speak. They will however, move from one end of the
philosophical spectrum to the other, for the most part - from the philosophically
descriptivist, almost entirely biomedical understanding of health on one hand to the
very philosophically normative, highly holistic understanding of health on the other
end - but this simple terminology will hopefully keep the definitions grounded in the
practical reality that relates to my overall project. The five definitions are:

1. Health is the lack of disease or sickness.
2. Health is the state of being within biostatistical norms.
3. Health is the state in which an organism is able to properly function.
3. Health is a state in which one is able to properly function in the world.
4. Health is a state in which one is able to achieve vital goals in their life.

Once the preexisting theories have been explored, I will attempt to establish my
own concept of health that will be the most useful for the sake of the doctor/patient
8

	
  
relationship. It may be noted here that it is possible to discuss the concept of health in
many different contexts, and theories of health are often postulated for many different
reasons. Some of the theories that I will discuss are exploring health as a project in
ontology, searching only for a theoretical notion of a concept, while others attempt to
draw distinctions and lines of demarcation for the sake of practical implications in
fields such as medical insurance or law. I therefore find it necessary to stress the point
that this exploration of the concept of health, as well as the entire first part of this
project, will move forward in the context of the pure interaction between doctor and
patient. I am searching for a notion of health that will serve as a desired teleological
outcome in the project of the physician - not as a legal stipulation or a purely
theoretical notion.

Health as the lack of disease

The question of the nature of health almost always accompanies an inquiry into
the nature of disease. As discussed previously, it has become a subconscious
assumption, at least in our own culture, that health and disease are inherently related.
And even in philosophical writing, there is almost never a discussion of health without
a discussion of disease - we have come to use the terms ‘sick’ (or ‘ill’) and ‘healthy’ as
the two opposite poles of our state of being. And because the term ‘disease’ is the most
common term for the cause of a ‘sick’ or ‘ill’ state, the concept of the disease has
become the evil entity that opposes and impedes upon our normal state – one of health.
Even in contemporary medical education, the concept of diagnosis is central to
an understanding of proper practice - a doctor is not trained to look for health. Rather,
9

	
  
they are trained to isolate and identify different diseases (Scadding). Because there can
be so many different kinds of disease - so many maladies with clear, objective, easily
stated criteria - it is very easy to define the concept of disease simply as a set, or group,
of all of these specific instances of disease. That is, the whole concept of disease itself is
easily defined as a summation of all the individual diseases. Disease becomes tangible
and isolatable - one can easily point to a thing and label it as ‘disease’ - while health
remains entirely abstract. There are no named, isolatable ‘instances’ of health. This
conceptualization of medicine as diagnosing malady tends to lead patients and doctors
alike to the natural assumption that disease is a deviation from the normal state,
leaving health simply as a lack.
Furthermore, some thinkers have come to conceptualize disease as prior, in
some way, to health. The ‘reverse theory of health,’ described by K. W. M. Fulford, is
based upon the notion that disease must be given an epistemic priority over health in
our natural experience of the world. The argument is fairly simple - because we don’t
actively experience health until we experience disease, it is really disease that gives rise
to health (experientially), and not vice versa. That is, if a person were healthy for all of
their life, they would never recognize the notion of health. Interestingly, disease would
then not be considered a deviation from health, but rather, an experience in and of
itself. It would only be once that disease passed that the person would experience
health, rendering disease the truly powerful and unavoidable state of our being
(Fulford). With this reading, it would no longer be useful or desirable to discuss health
without disease. Rather, it would be impossible to discuss health without disease.
So, it seems that from an experiential perspective, it is clear that one should
consider health to be the opposite of disease. It is true that from an epistemic
10

	
  
perspective, we only actively experience health in relation to some other state, which is
most commonly one of disease. Growing up, many of us think of health as the end goal
of ‘getting better’ after a malady - it is experienced as a state of recovery. But I think
this assertion of disease’s priority is quickly eliminated when one looks at the reality of
every day life. If we are speaking experientially, how could one make the argument that
one does not feel better or worse on one day than they did on another? Even without
the presence of disease, the way in which we experience the world, and experience the
body, is constantly in flux. It is not necessary for a biomedically recognized malady to
be introduced to our bodies in order for us to recognize positivity in our state of being.
(This will be greatly elaborated upon in the following chapter.)
But regardless of the question of epistemic priority, the entire notion that
recovering from disease leads to health – or even the idea that acquiring a disease leads
to a lack of health – is created largely by our understanding of reason. Sadegh-Zadeh
points out a clear fact about our perception of health and disease - our natural
reasoning is entirely Aristotelian when it comes to the distinction between the two.
This leads us to assume a few things about the two concepts. We assume that a person
is either healthy or not healthy, but not at the same time, and we assume that an
individual is ill1 or not ill, but not both at the same time. And as described above, our
epistemic experience of the world has led us to believe that these two concepts are in
strict opposition to one another. We have therefore come to understand each concept
as the lack of the other – ‘not ill’ is synonymous with ‘healthy’ and ‘not healthy’ is
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1 ‘Ill’ here refers to a state of disease - the distinction between illness and disease is a
question of medical demarcation and is really unnecessary for this discussion - when I
refer to disease or illness, I refer to an isolatable, named malady that a doctor would
diagnose.
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synonymous with ‘ill.’
It seems that this is an intuitive reality - that it is an unavoidable truth that an
unhealthy person is not a healthy person, and because of our perceived definition of the
way the two concepts work, that the person must be ill. But in examining the
diagnostic process, we see that this view might be problematic. When the doctor is
examining the patient, he or she, as Scadding points out, is searching for
malfunctioning of some kind. If this malfunctioning is discovered and the cause is
isolated, this experience of causal malfunctioning (the combination of cause and effect)
will likely be dubbed a disease (or illness or syndrome) and named - strep throat, for
example. I think Scadding makes an unwarranted jump at this point - he would then
say that the patient is in a state of disease, and hence is not in a state of health. There
are two problems with this.
One is highlighted by Sadegh-Zadeh - the fact that a person is ill does not
necessarily mean that they are not also healthy. This is an assumption based on our
innate understanding of reason in a basic Aristotelian way, and it is very possible that
this is a totally flawed assumption. That is, linguistically, and logically, any state
cannot both be and not be at the same time. When we use the phrase “The sky is blue,”
it naturally seems to follow that we also mean “The sky is not not blue.” This is
obviously made clear in symbolic logic by the rules of negation – we draw the
assumption that there can be blue, and there can be not blue, but not both in the same
thing at the same time.
And yet, we see these types of things every day – things that are both blue and
not blue. In some of his dialogues, Plato even addresses this issue in the Republic, for
instance, during his discussion of Being, he notes that any quality that exists in a thing
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also does not exist in that thing. He uses the famous example of the beautiful –
anything that is beautiful is also in some way not beautiful. It is not at all difficult to
see how this would apply to health. There are always ways in which we would call
ourselves healthy, but could we not, realistically, always find something about our state
that is wrong in some way? It seems that we can always find something that we would
want ‘fixed’ by the doctor. And yet, we go on considering ourselves healthy. Clearly, we
can – and are – always both healthy and not healthy. And as soon as we can isolate
that thing that is not ‘good’ about our state, it becomes a disease, by our previous
definition. Hence, it is nearly always the case that health and disease exist in us
simultaneously. The simple fact that a person is ill does not mean that they are not
healthy. It seems that our experiential way of understanding health and disease does
not hold.
The other problem with Scadding’s assertion follows from this realization, and
pertains to the distinction between ‘having a disease’ and ‘being in a state of disease.’ It
does not necessarily follow that the whole person has somehow ‘lost’ their health just
because a single system within their body is not functioning properly. Even if health
were to be understood as the lack of disease, it would not necessarily follow that the
person is in an overall state of disease because of a single malfunction.
But despite all that has been said, even if we were to accept the fact that health is
the lack of disease, isolating a specific disease is not always as easy as isolating a strand
of bacteria. That is, even if health were simply the opposite of disease, how would one
universally set the distinction between disease and health? Consider the case of high
cholesterol – it is considered to be a disease, but what is it that denotes its presence?
There is no pathogen that has invaded the body of the patient; no observable lack of
13

	
  
ability that is clearly causally attributed to the condition. It seems that there are many
diseases that are not as easy to isolate and identify as Scadding assumes. This problem,
in addition to the previously mentioned issues, suggests that there needs to be more
specific criteria that denotes health, and a lack thereof. Through this discussion, it has
been realized that the ‘everyday,’ natural, experiential way of looking at health and
disease as opposites leaves us with a very undeveloped notion. If health and disease are
to be understood in opposition to one another, there needs to be a clearer, technical
way of doing so.

Health as a biostatistical norm

Clearly, the previous discussion gives rise to a very important question regarding
health and disease - even if health were the absence of disease, what then, exactly,
would designate the difference? In this section, we will explore the way in which most
scientists answer this question. To clarify, it is not the goal of this section to determine
an overall understanding of the concept of a disease. Rather, the point of this section is
to rethink the possibility of dividing the two concepts.
In the previous section, it became clear that the concept of disease could simply
be understood as the set of all diseases. Furthermore, it was determined that lines of
demarcation between biological conditions that are and are not diseases are not so
easily drawn. It is the object of this section to further clarify the difference between the
two - health and disease - in order to illuminate what exactly the doctor is trying to
move towards, and what the doctor is trying to move away from, in terms of the state of
his or her patient.
14

	
  
In the previous section, diseases were roughly conceptualized as the named
maladies that negatively affect a biological system in a person - essentially, as the
isolated examples of perceived ill-health. Obviously, this is inherently problematic for
most philosophers of medicine, for a number of reasons. But the primary issue with
this understanding lies with the question of inclusion and exclusion in the categories.
In conceptualizing health and disease as opposites, which biological conditions qualify
as a disease, and which qualify as health? That is, when a physician finds a new
condition of the body that has not been observed before clinically, what is it about that
condition that leads the scientist to deem it as a disease? Saying that it negatively
affects health would obviously be circular for the sake of our argument - so there needs
to be something else that qualifies these conditions as ‘disease’ or ‘lack of health’ in
order to ground and solidify the ‘opposite of disease theory’ of health, or what we will
come to describe as the descriptivist theory.
Christopher Boorse (1977) is the leading thinker in this camp, having published
multiple books and articles that have been extremely widely cited by other philosophers
of health. His theory is considered the biostatistical theory of health (BST), and from a
philosophical perspective, is highly descriptive - his argument rests on the assertion
that health is an empirical, objective, value free concept. In short, he draws the
distinction between the two objective concepts of health and disease by considering the
statistical norms of a reference class. Boorse’s concept of health simply refers to
normal functioning, while the concept of disease refers to abnormal functioning.
Because of this, health becomes completely objective and only discoverable by natural
science - any evaluation or judgment by a subjective observer is completely irrelevant.
According to BST, health is a statistically typical contribution of all processes
15

	
  
and components of a person towards the overall goal of the person - survival and
reproduction. The term ‘statistically typical’ refers to the statistical norm within a
reference group, and is not necessarily representative of the entire population of
humans - obviously, the statistical norms of a twenty-year-old male are not the same as
those of a ninety-year-old woman. The point of Boorse’s theory is that health is a clearcut notion. It is not tied up with any sort of subjective value, in that its end or goal is
determined biologically. Similarly, the concept of disease is simply a biostatistically
determined lack of such functioning. It would seem that this notion put forward by
Boorse is quite simple and easily acceptable - if each system in a person’s body is
functioning in a way that is objectively determined to be biologically normal, it would
seem that they must be in good health.
But once again, some major problems arise, both in terms of his formulation of
the specifics of the theory and with the question of the basis of the theory as a whole.
Within the theory, the description and formulation of the reference class is quite
problematic (Kingma). Boorse himself describes the idea of a reference class as a group
that has the same functional design, by nature (Boorse, 1977, p. 562). Clearly, this
leaves a lot up for interpretation. The theory makes sense when one conceptualizes the
reference class simply by age and gender, but how do other natural characteristics of a
person come into play? Things like religion and environment are clearly intentionally
excluded by his definition, in an attempt to universalize the concept. But consider the
instance of a reference class such as ‘twenty year old males who are blind.’ They all
have the same functional design, by nature. So, if each individual in the set has
similarly functioning biological systems – regardless of the fact that they are blind –
then they are all in a state of health, according to Boorse, despite the fact that blindness
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is commonly considered to be a state of disease in other reference classes. Now, it
would make sense for one to say that a reference class cannot be based on something
that is a disease, but obviously, this would be a circular argument (Kingma). This
ambiguity muddles the objectivity of his theory - and there are certainly other examples
that would be equally problematic.
The other major issue with the BST as a whole also arises out of the specific
example given above. From Boorse’s perspective, the twenty year old blind male who is
biologically functioning completely normally would still seem like he should be in a
state of disease, given the fact that blindness is a biologically abnormal and detrimental
condition in many other reference classes. Hence, if one removed the stipulation of
blindness from the reference class, that same twenty year old male would never be able
to be in a state of health. That person could live to the age of 105, have three children
and lead a completely happy life, but Boorse would still argue that he lived a life laden
by disease, never achieving health.
To use another example, how would Boorse view a person living with an obscure
allergy or a person with a transplanted heart? They are biostatistical outliers, but are
they really in an eternal state of disease? Furthermore, what would Boorse say about a
twenty year old male who is utterly miserable, but biostatistically normal? Because we
are examining health in the context of the doctor and patient, these questions must be
raised.
Boorse recognizes these problems with his theory, and in response, draws
another distinction between theoretical health (what was just discussed) and practical
health. He defines practical health as the opposite of illness, which he defines as an
‘undesirable’ disease (Boorse, 1976, p. 68). In order to keep his theory grounded in
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objectivity, he adds that the lack of desirability must have some link to the design of the
species - that a disease must be undesirable because it is impeding upon some
biological process. In his attempt to explain the clinical setting, and open a more
realistic understanding of health, he moves from a descriptivist, objective
understanding of health to a very undeveloped normative one (Fedoryka). Regardless
of how Boorse presents it, there is clearly an evaluation that must take place in the
clinical setting in order to determine practical health. The question of ‘conformity to
species design’ is vague and unhelpful, especially from a clinical perspective. It pushes
the realm of medicine into one that is no longer rooted in objective science, but rather
rooted in a specific doctor’s understanding of objective science. As Fedoryka points
out, this movement towards practical health is really just a shift towards an
undeveloped normative theory.
By arriving at this practical notion, we are confronted by a fundamental reality
of clinical health - it seems that it is almost unavoidable to incorporate at least some
normativity in a useful definition. This is not to say that the BST cannot be useful, but
it seems that it is not enough to encompass what a proper notion of health is in a
clinical setting. That is, it does not do us any good in our project of defining the goal of
the physician. From this analysis, it seems that health is something inherently tied to
one’s ability to function in the world, but that this idea needs much more clarification
and explanation.
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Health as the state in which an organism is able to properly function2

Moving towards a normative conception of health gives rise to a plethora of
different nuanced theories about the notion of health. The obvious problem with a
movement into the realm of normativity is that any objective, universally applicable
understanding of health that is strived for by the descriptivist seems to be lost. It is
because of this issue that many thinkers try to come up with a way of utilizing a
normative description in a somewhat objective way3. For example, in her article
“Health as a Normative Concept: Towards a New Conceptual Framework,” Kateryna
Fedoryka makes the claim that health is, ‘a dimension of the good of a being which is a
direct function of the nature of that being’ (p. 155) and ‘a dimension of the individual in
which a certain unfolding of being happens in virtue of the natural structure of that
being’ (p. 155). In this definition, it is acknowledged that health is a movement towards
a goal - natural actualization - and this goal is the reference point to which functions
are considered to be good. There is clearly a normative element, in that the function is
labeled as good, but by considering the goal ‘natural actualization,’ Fedoryka avoids the
subject’s influence on the definition. Natural actualization is something determined by
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
2	
  At this point in the discussion, with the movement from descriptivism to
normativism, explicit discussion of the concept of disease is largely abandoned – it no
longer serves as a useful concept in establishing the goal of the physician. As will
become clear, an objective understanding of the exclusion/inclusion criteria for disease
will not be particularly important to the physician’s project, nor to this project.	
  
3 It seems that many philosophers of medicine are tied up with the idea that a
‘universal’ definition of health has to be solidified, so that the project of medicine can
transcend the boundaries of culture, religion, etc. It seems that they are seeking
justification for the imposition of ‘medical care’ on any and all populations, and this
could be for a wide variety of reasons – legal, economic, even ethical. But as it will be
seen, this drive towards a universally understood definition of ‘health’ is both
unnecessary and unnatural.
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biology. It is a state generated by the structure of the organism itself – a state in which
the systems of an organism would be functioning in a way that would actualize the
organism, given that there is no negative outside influence from the will. In “Health as
an Objective Value,” Lennox argues that health is necessarily normative in a similar
way - that the concept of health refers to a state in which all of an organisms goaloriented biological systems are contributing to the overall goal of life. The fact that the
goal of an organism is to sustain life should, according to Lennox, be implicitly
understood.
Both of these theories claiming to be based on ‘objective value’ seem to be
attempts to rework the ideas of Boorse in order to fix the ‘practical health’ issue. They
seem to be attempts at bridging his two notions in order to establish one that is as
objective as the theoretical while acknowledging the inherent normativity of the
practical. But it is important to understand and acknowledge the fact that in drawing
the distinction between the two, Boorse was not only acknowledging that health has a
normative dimension in addition to the descriptivist dimension. I think, judging even
by the names ‘theoretical’ and ‘practical,’ that Boorse was also acknowledging the fact
that his theoretical concept could only be applicable in theory - and the ‘objective value’
approach suffers from the same shortcoming.
By shifting to the practical, Boorse was certainly acknowledging the inherent
need for a normative influence, but what gives rise to this inherent normativity is the
fact that all instances of health are already in the world, to use Heidegger’s
terminology. Both Lennox and Fedoryka claim that health is a state in which an
organism can accomplish the goal of life - the state in which it can successfully actualize
itself naturally. But both have similarly ignored the fact that the environment in which
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an organism lives is never constant, and is very influential on an organism’s ability to
actualize itself. This idea solves many of the problems that arise in the discussion of
biostatistics, but completely ignores the practical reality of health.
In the attempt to make health objective and only value-laden in so far as biology
dictates a goal (avoiding true worldliness in the definition), Lennox and Fedoryka have
ignored the fundamental fact that the biological systems are always functioning, or
actualizing, in the world. Once a person is in the world, a reciprocal relationship
emerges immediately. The person is no longer able to be viewed in and of itself – it
must be recognized that the person can affect the world, and that the world can affect
that person. The best way to discuss worldliness in practical, non-Heideggerian terms
is to view the duality as a relationship between a willing subject and an external
environment.

Health as the state in which one is able to properly function in the world

Because all biological systems are already in the world, all of these systems are
open to, and influenced by, the environment and the will. It is impossible to isolate the
activity of any biological system in a realistic sense - the human body is not selfperpetuating. The metabolism cannot properly function without the intake of food, for
example. And this intake of food can only happen if the person wills to eat the food, and
receives the food from his or her environment.
The will and the environment then necessarily become a part of these seemingly
isolated biological systems. Even on a medical or scientific level, it is impossible to
isolate and evaluate the efficacy of the human body in and of itself - all biological
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systems need something from the outside world, whether that be oxygen, water,
glucose, a certain protein or vitamin, etc. It is not like trying to evaluate the state of a
car without a driver or gasoline – it is impossible, and useless, to evaluate a person’s
body while ignoring their mind and environment. In the diagnostic process of a
mechanic, he can easily make a statement like, “This car just needs a different driver”
or “You have to use different oil, a higher quality of gas and stop driving it off road.”
In the case of a human, this is not so simple. The doctor can’t simply proclaim, “Your
body is fine, you just need different desires, passions and tendencies,” and think that
the problem is solved. Similarly, the doctor cannot make the claim that a patient
simply needs to move to a different area of the world and adopt an entirely new way of
life – at least in a realistic and useful sense. It is therefore useless – and arguably
impossible – to discuss an organism while disregarding its environment and will.
If the environment and the will are taken into account, the conception of health
changes significantly. Health becomes the state in which an organism has an active and
successful relationship with the environment. Conceptualized in these terms, health is
both a state and an order - as a state, health is the body’s ability to handle the
difficulties imposed upon it by the environment, and as an order, it is the body’s ability
to expand and actualize its possibilities (Mordacci, 487). Clearly, the necessary
imposition of the environment and the will upon health significantly reduces the
amount of clarity that the definition has.
The idea that health is the ability to adapt to and thrive in an environment is
much more vague and ambiguous than the previously discussed definitions - in
accepting that the notion of health is now opened to the environment, it must be
recognized that it is opened to the totality of an environment, or in other words, a
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world. This does not only include the physical environment, but also the social,
political, and moral environment (Kovacs). And in opening health to the influence of
the will, we are confronted with the question of how subjective intentions and
evaluations will affect the notion.
Through this movement, the idea that health is an organism’s ability to ‘function
in the world’ has been greatly expanded. By ‘function in the world,’ we no longer mean
exist as an isolated organism that can actualize some biological processes in order to
sustain life. The phrase now implies that an organism must be able to actively and
successfully participate with its world. Naturally, a number of questions arise here.
How far can the domain of health be expanded into the involvement with the world?
How exactly are we to understand this notion?
Before moving forward, let us revert to the original intention of this project - to
identify health as the teleological goal of the doctor/patient interaction. It may seem
that the notion of health that we’ve arrived at is leaving the realm of medicine, but this
is not the case. What seems to be happening, rather, is that the notion of health, and
therefore the project of the doctor, is expanding out from the realm of biology. With
this expanding view of health, the project of the doctor is expanding beyond the
concept of a ‘biological human technician.’ It may be useful here to ground the
movement in an example.
Consider the woman who comes into the doctor’s office on a Monday afternoon
for a check-up. During the physical examination, the doctor finds patterned bruising
on her back, which is clearly the result of blunt trauma, but other than this, her
biological systems seem to be functioning fine. The doctor also notices that she is tired
and disheveled - her hair is matted and her eyes bloodshot. At the end of the exam, she
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explicitly mentions to the doctor that she is in a violent relationship and that it she is
worried that she may lose her job because of the toll it is taking on her. Considering
this patient as an isolated organism, the doctor would deem her to be in a state of
health - all biological systems are doing their job, and are even within biostatistical
norms. Without considering her environment or will, the doctor’s job would be done according to the previous definitions of health, this woman is perfectly fine, and it
would not be the doctor’s job to impose on any activities or events in her life that are
unrelated to her health.
On the other hand, if he expanded his understanding of health, he would view
her violent relationship as an impediment on her health - he would acknowledge the
fact that her environment was disallowing her from achieving health, and help her in
any way he could to alter or overcome the plights in her environment that were
harming her. When she thanked him, he would be able to rationalize his actions by
explaining that it is his job as a doctor to make sure she is healthy. Clearly,
environmental context has to be considered in the determination of overall health - it
cannot just be an objective evaluation of all the isolated biological systems of a person.
But consider another more puzzling example. Consider a woman with the same
conditions, but this time, place her in Country X. She is still disheveled and beaten by
her husband, but in the culture, this is normal. By considering the totality of her
environment, it would seem that she is in a state of health - she is functioning perfectly
well for the cultural standards. But as a western observer, it still seems that this is in
some way wrong - that her environment is detrimental to her health. It would seem
that this is an example of how consideration of the overall environment can be harmful
in the determination of health. This illuminates the problem with inclusion of all
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environmental factors in a descriptivist theory - as an external observer, all one can do
is consider this woman’s ability to function in her environment - she either is able or
she is not. Even as a physician, observation of this woman wouldn’t enable one to say
she is not in a state of health. The first woman was clearly not in a state of health
because she was losing her job - it’s clear that she was not properly functioning in her
environment. But assuming that this woman is able to perform all of the tasks that she
normally performs, despite being in a brutally abusive relationship, she is functioning
perfectly well in the world, and hence, is in a state of health.
The above situation seems inherently problematic, and it is likely for two
reasons. The first is that our evaluation of the above scenario is still descriptive - she
either is or is not able to function in her environment. But this is not really the case in
terms of functioning in the world. Functionality is not really a descriptivist notion - it is
more of a normative one. We say that a person is functioning well or not functioning
well. It is not a matter of true or false, it is a matter of evaluation - the question is not if
a person is functioning, it is how well is a person functioning in their environment. So
with the introduction of the environment, we also must introduce normativism.
The second reason the situation seems problematic is that we are not
considering the question of the will. Does the second woman want to be in the position
she is in? Is she there by force, or does she opt to stay? When discussing worldliness,
the specific questions of the will seem to be of paramount importance. Regardless of
the way the environment interacts with the subject, what ultimately matters for health
in the worldly relationship is the subject’s attitude towards their situation. The ability
for one to function in the world cannot be something that is examined from the outside,
even if worldliness is taken into account. What matters most about the practical reality
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of health is that it belongs to an individual. Although an individual’s environment in
the world certainly influences his or her health, their subjective judgments and
understandings are ultimately what will dictate the state of health.

Health as the state in which one is able to achieve vital goals in life

Upon introduction of the environment, the notion of health loses most, if not all,
of its objective qualities, and becomes normative and evaluative - the prior definition
ceases to work, and a level of positivity or negativity must be assigned to a person’s
level of functioning in their environment. Hence, there must be some evaluation of a
person’s functionality in the world - the idea must change from ‘health is a state in
which a person is able to function in the world’ to ‘health is a state in which a person is
able to function well in the world.’ From a theoretical standpoint, an evaluation of how
well or not well a person is functioning in their environment would be done by society
in a type of cultural process (Kovacs). The process of evaluation could never be viewed
as objective in any sense, which is not a problem in itself. But a problem does arise
when one considers that an individual’s views may not match the views of their society
or culture. To use the previous definition, if it is generally held by Country X’s culture
that the proper function of a woman in society is to be completely subordinate to her
husband regardless of any violence or harm that he may cause her, and to do the duties
that he commands her to do, then even if this woman was completely miserable, and in
a state of suffering, the society of Country X would consider her to be doing quite well
in terms of her function in the world, and hence, she would be in a state of health
regardless of her will.
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But if we have accepted the fact health is a matter of subjective evaluation, then
it does not seem just for anyone but the individual subject who’s health is being
considered to evaluate their own state in the world. That is, if the wills of other
subjects are being considered in order to determine general rules for the basis of health,
it only makes sense for the individual subject in question to make the final decision on
whether or not they are in a good state. To refer to the clinical setting, it seems clear
that the patient’s own understanding of their condition is more important than their
societies understanding of a condition. The environment or society may very well
influence the evaluation in some way, but ultimately, the will of that individual is
paramount.
Nordenfeldt acknowledges this reality about the will of the individual in his
conception of health, introducing the notion of goal achievement. In his theory,
Nordenfeldt goes beyond the idea that health is a person’s ability to function well,
asserting that health is a state in which an individual can function well according to his
own will. To use his words, “P is healthy, if and only if, given standard circumstances,
P has the ability to realize his or her vital goals. P’s vital goals constitute the set of
those states of affairs which are necessary and together sufficient for P’s minimal
happiness” (Nordenfeldt, 1993, p. 8). Interestingly and controversially, Nordenfeldt
bases his theory of health upon happiness, and not just a biological end like survival or
reproduction. With this understanding of the idea alone, there are two apparent
problems with Nordenfeldt’s theory that pertain to this discussion, both pointed out by
Schramme (2007).
The first objection raised by Schramme is that the theory includes far too much
exclusion criteria by associating health directly with happiness. Schramme asserts that
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there must be a more solidified scientific basis for what situations count as illness and
which situations are just examples of failure or unhappiness. To illustrate this, he gives
the example of an athlete, Lily, who cannot meet her goal of jumping two meters - an
ambition she has had all her life. Lily has no biological abnormalities or diseases, but
she cannot achieve this goal, no matter how hard she tries. Schramme claims that
under Nordenfeldt’s definition, Lily would be considered ill, despite the fact that she is
clearly healthy, emphasizing a major inadequacy in Nordenfeldt’s definition.
In response, Nordenfeldt first stresses the fact that health is not a descriptive
concept - that there is a range of health from very high to very low, but he
acknowledges the fact that Schramme would probably refuse to accept that her health
is lowered in any way, and moves on to his next point. Nordenfeldt stresses the fact
that a person’s goals are a reflection of mental health - that if this athlete cannot
achieve even minimal happiness without jumping two meters, that she certainly is not
in a state of health. Hence, in this circumstance, the care would not be provided by a
surgeon. Rather, it would be provided by a psychiatrist who would help her reassess
her vital goals in life.
The second issue that Schramme raises is that Nordenfeldt’s theory is entirely
dictated by a subject’s sensation and experience - he raises the question of dormant
diseases that are asymptomatic. That is, he asks how, given Nordenfeldt’s theory, a
person could be considered medically abnormal (not in a state of health) if they do not
feel badly. In reply, Nordenfeldt explains his analysis of the concept of disease - that a
disease is a bodily or mental process that has, in past cases, produced suffering in some
way (2007). Though not explicit in his reply to Schramme, I think Nordenfeldt’s point
is one we realized near the outset of this discussion - that a person can be both in a
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state of health and in a state of disease - that these two concepts are not antonymous to
one another. A person with dormant cancer, for instance, may have a disease, but also
be in a state of health.
I find Nordenfeldt’s formulation to be a very satisfying way of defining health in
terms of a person’s subjective understanding of their ability to interact with the world.
However, as noted by George Khushf in his article, “An Agenda for Future Debate
Regarding Health and Disease,” Nordenfeldt seems to push a bit too far into the realm
of the practical, without considering the theoretical notions upon which his ideas are
built. That is, Nordenfeldt’s definition of health establishes a teleological goal that
medicine can strive towards, in a real and practical way, but it does not seem to be clear
what the philosophical backing is behind this issue.
Clearly, according to our originally stated goal in this section, Nordenfeldt’s
definition seems to achieve the precise goal of the whole discussion. However, now that
a holistic, practical medical telos has been realized (or seems to have been realized), it
is necessary to examine what is going on behind these assertions. That is, we must
engage in a deeper philosophical examination of the basis behind the movement we
have just experienced. To clarify, Nordenfeldt’s notion does seem useful, but in order
to fully understand this practical idea, we must look deeper at the movement that
resulted in our acceptance of it.
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Section 2: Being as the Basis for Health
In the previous section, we have come to one clear realization, if none other: that
the notion of health is exceedingly complicated and controversial. Clearly, there are a
multitude of ways to define health, with different nuances and specificities. It seems
that there has to be some underlying philosophical issue behind all of the debate – one
that will help further illuminate what the true goal of the physician is. Although
Nordenfeldt’s definition does seem somewhat practically satisfying, one cannot help
but inquire into the philosophical underpinnings of the entire debate. It seems that
there is something lurking throughout the discussion, some reason that the debate even
exists. It is the goal of this section to examine the previous movement, with hopes that
a basis may be found for the confusion about health. Furthermore, from that basis, I
hope to arrive at a philosophically sound way of thinking about health, and a clear telos
for the project of medicine.
Thus, in this section, three major points will ultimately be realized. The first is
that discussions of health must be understood as inherently human. The second is the
fact that health is a human construct, and that this construct is based on a subjective
notion of being, which is why the task of defining health has become so difficult. The
third is that in western society, our notion of being is completely fragmented, and this
leads to a massive amount of confusion about health and medicine4. Through the
discussion of these issues, a useful theoretical notion behind the project of the
physician will come to light.

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
4 This notion is somewhat similar to Gadamer’s discussion of health in The Enigma of
Health, The Art of Healing in a Scientific Age.
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The humanity of medicine

It seems that the most blatant realization made in the previous section is that
any discussion of health in medicine must acknowledge the fact that it is addressing an
issue that is inherently and intimately human in nature. Throughout the discussion,
there is not only a movement from the philosophically descriptive to the
philosophically normative – there is also a clear movement from the discussion of an
object to the discussion of a subject. As the definition of health widens, what seems to
be occurring is an incorporation of the things that make humans different than other
organisms. A seemingly obvious fact starts to come to light – it seems that human
health is completely different than any other kind of health, and it must be treated as
such.
In the earlier definitions, the human is treated as a body that is subject to
external imposition, a thing that can be statistically evaluated for normality from an
external and objective perspective. This way of thinking about health may be useful in
the examination of a plant, or even of an animal. But what seemed to be continually
overlooked was that the entire notion of health – of normal functioning, of statistical
norms of a lack of some pathogen – is an idea that is created by our own understanding
of what it is to be.
We are tied up in a method of thinking by which we assume that we are
functioning in a single metaphysical paradigm – the common assumption about the
concept of human health is that it’s generated by the way the natural world functions.
The early concepts discuss the functioning of biological systems as if they are inherent
to our own notion of what it is to be in a positive state. The descriptivist notions make
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a blatant assumption that humans are simply organisms – that scientific observation
and theories about the biosphere can be turned and applied to us, since we are
biologically and physiologically similar to the rest of the living world.

Health as a human construct and a derivative of being

What these descriptivist theories are fundamentally misunderstanding is that
the notion of health is one that can only exist if humanity exists. Health is not a
concept that is derived from the observation of the way the external world functions –
rather, it is the opposite. In reality, health is an externalization of our own
understanding of being – it is a concept that we selfishly throw upon the world, due to
the way we inherently think. It is clear that each specific notion of health is seeking to
explain, in clear and objective terms, a single phenomenon – what it means to be a
certain way:
-The ‘lack of disease’ theory strives to make the claim that a human is being well
when they do not have a clear-cut malady that has been previously perceived in a
negative way.
-Similarly, the ‘functioning in the world’ theory asserts that the human is being
well when it can perform tasks that will result in its physical survival and longevity
within its society.
-The statistical model is somewhat different, as it makes a strong attempt to
remove the notion of health from any sort of normative notion at all – claiming that
health simply describes normality. But I think its quite clear that this is really an
attempt to describe some larger phenomenon in clearer and more precise terms – it is
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an attempt to solidify both the ‘normal functioning’ and the ‘lack of disease’ models in
clear, mathematical terms. For if health were nothing more than normality, the word
‘health’ and the notion of ‘normal’ would be no different than one another – what it is
trying to do is explain the concept of the ‘normal’ as it relates to being5.
-Nordenfeldt’s notion of health can easily be seen as addressing the issue of
being. By discussing ‘vital goals,’ Nordenfeldt is making a practical assertion (possibly
too practical) about our deeper philosophical notions of what it means to be.
In recognizing that the notion of being is at the center of all attempts to define
health, it becomes quite clear that the entire notion of health is a construct of the
human – it is a way of describing what it is to be well. This is, quite literally, the
definition of health – ‘holistic health’ is often used as a synonym of the term ‘well
being.’ When we define any other thing in the world as ‘healthy,’ we are making an
assertion that is based on our own understanding of what it is to be. In saying that a
tree is healthy, we are making a judgment about the being of that tree – we are
imposing a definition of the tree’s being, and then judging the tree based upon that
definition. In other words, our assertion that the tree is healthy rests upon our own
assertion that it is good for trees to continue to grow, sprout leaves, produce seeds, etc.
We assume that this is a fundamental fact about the tree – but in reality, this is not
necessarily the case. We have no idea what a tree is supposed to do – what a tree is
supposed to be like. The only thing that we can do is make a judgment about how it is
supposed to be. Hence, when we say it is healthy, we are making an unwarranted
assumption about the tree. We assume that trees are supposed to grow and age
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
5 The term ‘being’ here is not supposed to refer exclusively to any specific philosophical
interpretation of it – it is intentionally left ontologically open.
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because that is how we perceive our own being. And to apply that to the realm of all
living organisms, our assertion that ‘well functioning’ is a state in which an organism is
able to reproduce and thrive is equally unwarranted.

The fragmented western conception of being

The fact that health is a human construct wouldn’t be at all problematic in
medicine, if we had any clear notion of what it meant to be. But in modern western
culture, we have an extremely complicated and confused idea. The purpose of our lives
is not as clear-cut and teleological as it was in other time periods or in other parts of the
world. In ancient Greece, for example, the notion of being was entirely holistic – the
project of medicine was explicitly understood in terms of a ‘harmony’ between soul and
body. In the Phaedrus, Plato writes, “medicine has to define the nature of the body and
the rhetoric of the soul” (p. 9). And even in other parts of the world in modern times,
being is understood entirely holistically. The Kogi people of Colombia, for example,
conceptualize being as ‘one with the entirety of the universe’ – all ailments are
understood as imbalance, or as having occurred due to deviation from the natural
moral order (Riechel-Dolmatoff).
The problem, or condition, that currently exists in our world is due to the fact
that the natural scientific paradigm has become overwhelmingly widely accepted over
the course of the last century. Hence, our notion of what it is to be has become tied up,
almost exclusively, in a biological or scientific notion, rather than any other
philosophical one. In defining being in terms of science, we have put ourselves – the
subjective selves – on the level of all other life forms. In one sense, being has become
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nothing more than biological actualization, but at the same time, it still seems that
there is so much more to it. This is why it is so difficult to define health in western
culture – our world involves an inherent contradiction. Biology considers us a part of
the animal kingdom, and yet, we still strive to separate ourselves as a single, unique
entity that exists at a higher level than the rest of our animal peers. Our conception of
what it means to be has been brutally fragmented by the developments in natural
science, and we are having an extremely hard time putting the pieces back together.
It seems that there are three major positions that can be taken in the western
world when it comes to being, and each of these paradigms would have a different
understanding of the doctor and of medicine. These ideologies can be understood as
positions on a spectrum6:
On one end of the spectrum is the hard scientist, who genuinely believes that the
being of a human can be entirely understood and explained by mathematics and
science. These people truly believe that the human is an animal – that the only thing
separating us from the rest of the animal kingdom is evolutionary advancement. As far
as health goes, they are likely to side with the biological functionalist – claiming that
health is a state in which an organism can thrive in the physical environment in a way
that is no different than an amoeba. Hence, they would probably claim that the doctor
is just a bio-physiological specialist of the human body. In terms of the project of
medicine, then, they would understand the doctor as nothing more than any other
scientist. They would see the project of medicine as having a clear teleological
outcome, either adopting a Boorsian, statistical understanding of what it means to be
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
6 The ‘ends of the spectrum’ serve as archetypal – I am not making the claim that there
are a large number of people who actually take these positions. Rather, I am using the
positions as a way of illuminating the ideologies towards which people may tend.
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healthy, or a biologically functional understanding.
On the other end of the spectrum is the person who denies that science has a
major impact on what it means to be, and asserts that being is something much greater
than scientific understanding. These people would reject the notion that science holds
any primacy – and claim that assertions of the natural sciences are only grounded and
important insofar as they influence some other worldview. Most of the western people
of this group would be very religious. There’s no doubt that there are other groups in
the world that recognize some aspects of science, but see it as a secondary explanation
of being. But in the western world, most of these groups would be religious groups with
a clear understanding of what it is to be in the world – and hence, their notion of health
would be quite clear. They would understand the physician as a person who could help
them fix some parts of their being, but not all – the truly religious Christian, for
example, would likely understand biological problems as fairly minute in the greater
scheme of being. Nevertheless, this type of person would have a clear idea of what they
wanted out of the project of medicine, based upon their clear understanding of being,
whatever that may be.
If everyone embodied one of these two extreme archetypes, there wouldn’t be
much difficulty in defining the project of medicine. Both parties would come to the
doctor with a clear understanding of what they expected. But of course, these
archetypes are unrealistic. What is more common is the middle position – the position
that most people occupy in the western world. These people would have a fragmented,
unclear understanding of being, accepting most or all scientific assertions, but still
retaining some assertion that there’s ‘something more’ to being human. This group
likely asserts that biological health – keeping their bodies well – is an integral part of
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being as a whole, but that being involves more than this. The problem with this
position is that they would not know how to reconcile, or explain, their dual view. It
would be extremely difficult for these people to understand what they wanted out of
medicine – if one doesn’t understand their own being, then how can the doctor make it
well?
This exhibits the challenge of the western doctor – he must reconcile a notion of
being that has been shattered over the course of the last two centuries. He must
navigate the intricate and nuanced interplay between unclear notions of what it is to be
healthy. In doing so, he must treat the patient biologically, but also take into account
the patient’s personal understanding of what it is to be well in the world. This task is
much more difficult than the task of another type of doctor – a shaman, for instance.
The shaman has a clear idea of what it is to be healthy, and how the world works. His
patients believe in him and his methods, his explanations are clear and encompass the
patients whole being. When confronted with the ultimate challenge in medicine – the
possibility on non-being, or death, the shaman can come up with clear answers,
explanations, and decisions, since the paradigm of the shaman and his patient is whole
and clear.
But when the western doctor is confronted with situations that involve death, or
any major decision for that matter, a blatant mystery arises. Without a clear
understanding of what it is to be, it is extremely difficult to make decisions that involve
the possibility of non-being – it is difficult to make decisions at all, for that matter.
Since being is so loosely defined, health is equally loosely defined – and it is open to
each patient’s interpretation. The major problem with this is that most patients – and
many doctors – don’t even realize that this is happening. The western patient believes
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on a conscious level that he is only going to the doctor to fix his biological condition –
but he still expects to be treated like a human. People tend to like doctors who are kind
and warm, who treat them with compassion and empathy, who guide them through the
process of treatment while taking into account all of the things that affect their lives.
Although much of what the western doctor seeks to achieve is biological in nature, the
overall notion of health must encompass more than just the body – it must address the
hidden side of the patient’s perceived notion of being, the other parts of this confused
paradigm of the world.

The theoretical notion behind the physician’s project

It seems that Nordenfeldt comes close to realizing the scope of what health really
is, but pushes too far into the pragmatic with the idea of goal achievement. Nordenfeldt
seems to have recognized the fact that health is really just well being, but his
explanation of that concept is too practically oriented. In using the term ‘achieving
vital life goals,’ Nordenfeldt really makes the suggestion that a person is healthy when
they can go on living according to whatever they think living is supposed to look like –
according to their own understanding of being. The narrowness and overly practical
nature of his theory to criticisms such as the ‘inadequate athlete’ example – a
measurement of how badly one wants to achieve a certain specific goal in the world
should not yield a definition of health. Rather, an overall goal of life, which is derived
by one’s personal understanding of being, should yield a notion of health.
Clearly, when analyzing a person’s health, there is much more than just a goal
that must be understood and analyzed. But nonetheless, in western medicine, the
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biological state of the patient is key to the patient’s health, due to our complicated
paradigm. So how is the doctor to understand the reconciliation of the two? How is it
that the western doctor is to understand the complex interplay between overall well
being and the biological, or scientific, side of being?
In order to answer these questions, let us revert to the original assertion about
what happened to being upon the introduction of science to our world. I think it’s
important to understand that the common notion of being was not split after the
introduction of natural science – rather, it was fragmented. This is why our common
understanding of being is so complex – it is not the case that there are two notions of it,
or even three. Rather, there are a plethora of different instances of beings.
And because we defined health as a positive state of overall being, we must also
understand health in terms of this fragmentation. What seems to have happened, then,
is that we went from an overall understanding of Health, as a unified idea of being well,
to specific instances of health, or the specific ways in which we can be well. Health, as a
unified concept, turned into the set of all ‘healths,’ as it were. Now, we use terms like
‘spiritual health,’ ‘emotional health,’ ‘mental health,’ etc. All of these constitute the
fragmented parts of our overall notion of what makes up the holistic notion of Health,
or overall well being.
With this conceptualization, the role of the physician becomes a lot more
accessible, as do the previous assertions about health. The differences in a lot of the
definitions constitute which ‘healths’ the doctor is supposed to address, and which he is
not. I don’t think that anyone would argue that emotional health does not exist – but I
do think some thinkers would argue that it is not the role of the physician to address
this component of overall Health. What does seem to be universally agreed upon is
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that biological health is very important to the project of medicine. Every one of the
definitions that we discussed in the previous section addressed medical health as
biological in some way. What changed was how the health was treated, or understood,
beyond the biological context.
I think this is the key to understanding the project of the western doctor, as well
as the notion of health. It seems that it is the goal of any doctor, regardless of culture
or time period, to move his patient towards a notion of Health in some way. Over time
and throughout the world, some kinds of doctors may specialize, or may have
specialized, in different kinds of health (or, in other cases, they may have been able to
address Health as a whole), but all of these doctors have certainly been trying to bring
their patients towards overall Health. Even within our own culture, we can see other
health-specialists, such as marriage counselors, who seek to bring a person towards
overall Health by improving the health of their relationship. The western medical
doctor, then, is to be seen as the ‘biological health specialist.’
But if this were the simple goal of the physician, it seems that we could have
stopped the discussion a long time ago. This idea of a ‘human technician’ seems to be
what we have been moving away from – the previous movements have been towards a
humanization of medicine, not a re-emphasis on the biological.
But what has been realized is that the doctor must move towards biological
health only insofar as it improves a person’s overall Health. That is, it is absolutely
imperative to recognize the limits of the scope of western medicine, and the way it is
supposed to fit into a person’s attempt to establish Health. As previously noted, each
individual patient will have a totally different way of reconciling the two concepts –
biological health and Health as a whole. Some people will value their own biological
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health more than others. Clearly, there is a subjective, individualistic element to the
relationship between Health and biological health – and the physician must recognize
this in order to accomplish the overall goal of establishing Health.
This leads to a quite clear and satisfying answer to our original question. The
role of the physician is to be conceptualized as twofold. On one hand, the physician
must come to understand the complicated interplay between biological health and
overall Health in each one of his patients, in order to understand how decisions are to
be made in each specific medical context. He must recognize and respect each
subjective understanding of what it means to be, and be in Health, and base his
decisions upon the patient’s notion, and not his own. On the other hand, he must
actually improve upon the biological health of the patient, carrying out what we
consider ‘medical procedures’. Furthermore, although it is the doctor’s specific goal to
establish biological health, it is not to be forgotten that it is his overall project to
establish complete Health. Hence, he is to do whatever he feels is within his power to
accomplish this. The doctor is to realize and remember the limitations of his training
and not the limitations of his project. Therefore, if a patient complains of issues that
seem non-biological, but still effect Health, he is to do everything in his power to
address those issues – likely referring the patient, caringly, to another specialist.
Before moving on, let us first address an issue that may arise at first glance – it
seems that making a claim about ‘biological health’ re-raises the problem that was
being worked through in the previous section, sending us back to square one, with
different terminology – ‘biological health’ is still undefined. However, if we look at the
context in which the term is used, it is not at all problematic. That is, the term is simply
used as a vague notion of things that are generally considered to affect a person’s
41

	
  
experience of the world from a biological perspective. In other words, biological issues
are the ones the western medical doctor is trained to deal with.
We do not need specific inclusion or exclusion criteria for two reasons. The first
reason is that we have clearly stated that the overall project of the physician is to
establish holistic Health in the patient, although he is a biological health specialist.
With this understanding, a physician could never make the claim that a certain
borderline-biological issue is ‘outside of his jurisdiction.’ The physician must do
everything in his power to address any issue that may be considered biological. His
training is what will dictate what he can address. Furthermore, the second reason the
lack of a clear definition will not be a problem is that the patient’s subjective
understanding of holistic Health is what is used to make decisions about medicine.
This eliminates the doctor’s ability to force a procedure upon a patient in the name of
health. All decisions will be an agreement between physician and patient7.
So to clarify, the two major aspects of the physician’s role are 1) to come to a
specific understanding of the way each patient conceptualizes the interplay between
biological health and overall Health (or in other words, attempt to understand the
patient’s overall conception of being), and 2) to improve upon the biological health of
their patient. In addition, the physician is to remember that his ultimate goal is to
establish overall Health, and he is to do whatever he can to accomplish that goal. The
question that now needs to be asked is: how, exactly, is the western doctor supposed to
achieve this goal?
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
7 It is recognized here that this may cause a dilemma in certain circumstances, in which
the individual cannot make decisions for him/her self (ie. infants, the mentally insane,
the unconscious). This certainly needs to be addressed, but it does not fall within our
scope. The inquiry here seeks to address the common, every day clinical interaction.
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Part II: Actualizing the Goal of the Physician

Section 3: The Major Paradigms of Medicine
In light of the holistic, philosophically grounded notion of the project of the
physician, we can now begin to look into the way by which the physician is to achieve
his goal. In order to do so, it seems natural to start with a discussion of the two major
‘paradigms of medicine’ – patient centered medicine (PCM) and evidence-based
medicine (EBM). The two approaches will be explicated and explored in light of the
overall philosophical goal of the physician in order to determine which of the two, if
either, is a more effective route to accomplishing the overall project of the physician.
In light of our twofold goal of the physician, the hope is that we will be able to
come to find a way these two paradigms accomplish each of the two goals – both the
goal of establishing the patient’s understanding of the relationship between biological
health and holistic Health, and the goal of improving upon the notion of biological
health. Simply based off of the names, it seems that EBM may accomplish the first,
while PCM may accomplish the second – but that is left to be explored.

Evidence Based Medicine

Evidence based medicine is, in short, the process of gathering, appraising, and
utilizing relevant research findings in order to make decisions in the clinical setting. It
is based nearly exclusively upon a set of quantified data, and seeks to avoid the
‘subjective’ influence of the clinician in order to base decisions and actions in fact.
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From a practical perspective, EBM is based on four separate, yet equally important,
elements or steps8. These steps are used to ensure that the best medical treatment is
being used in any given scenario. The first step to EBM is the formulation of a question
according to the patient’s condition. This step involves a clarification and
quantification, to some extent, of the symptoms and signs. It is noted that they should
be as specific as possible, include a specific ‘type’ of patient (a classification according
to different characteristics), as well as a style of clinical intervention and the ‘clinical
outcome of interest.’ In their article ‘Evidence based medicine: an approach to problem
solving,’ Rosenberg and Donald use the following example of an appropriate question
in two parts: “How great is the annual risk of embolic stroke in a 77 year old woman
with non-rheumatic atrial fibrillation, hypertension, and moderate left ventricular
enlargement if she is not given anticoagulants?” (p. 1123) and “What is the risk of
reduction for stroke from warfarin therapy in such a patient, and what is the risk of
harming her with this therapy?” (p.1123).
Once the question is formed, the clinician must find the best available evidence,
based on what is available in literature databases. Large online data sets have been in
the process of assembly over the last several years, and are constantly being updated.
With some fairly elementary search skills, a clinician can find meta-analyses and other
articles that address prognosis and treatment of the condition, with reported data of
outcomes. With proper search technique in the right database, a large array of
information should be available.
Following the gathering of data, the clinician must appraise the evidence. This
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
8 This explanation of the steps of EBM is based largely upon the article ‘Evidence based
medicine: an approach to clinical problem solving’ by Rosenberg and Donald – they
give a clear and concise explanation of how, exactly, EBM works.
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part is slightly more complicated – it involves the interpretation of clinical studies with
regard to the specific patient. In this step, the clinician decides whether or not an
article is useful in terms of guiding the treatment. Although some clinicians are not
formally trained in research methodology and analysis, a method called ‘clinical
appraisal’ has become popular, in which a team of trained scientists answer a series of
standardized questions about published articles, and offer this appraisal along with the
research findings. This almost serves as an instructions manual for the research.
After the research has been appraised and it has been deemed that the article
will be relevant to the current state of the patient, the evidence must be acted upon. In
this stage, the clinician must isolate the useful components of the evidence that directly
relate to their own patient, and apply those same methods on the patient in hope that it
will have a similarly beneficial outcome.
In terms of our overall notion of the project of medicine, EBM seems to deal
exclusively with biological health. There does not seem to be explicit ‘room,’ so to
speak, for the doctor to attempt to understand the patient’s personal understanding of
being. That is, it seems that EBM only addresses one of the two major roles of the
overall project – the establishing and improving upon biological health. There is a
rather clear conceptual framework for this medical paradigm, and there is never any
explicit mention of the patient’s subjective influence. This is likely a major reason why
so many modern thinkers are tending away from the model – it seems to view health as
strictly biological.
But with our clear understanding of the physician’s goal, this does not pose a
problem. It seems completely legitimate to consider the possibility that EBM, as a
system of practicing medicine, could constitute one part of the overall medical
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paradigm. It could serve as the basis for the development of biological health, while
some other ideology or system could serve as the basis for establishing an overall
understanding of holistic Health in the patient. That is, EBM could be the way by
which physicians actualize a preconceived decision with regards to health. The fact that
these decisions need to be made through some other method does not pose much of a
problem – another paradigm can be used to accomplish this task. So as long as the
doctor understands and accepts the limitations of EBM, and is not viewed as the only
paradigm of medicine, it seems that it may be quite beneficial.
Furthermore, from a practical biological perspective, it is not hard to see why so
many scientists appreciate and support EBM – it seems to generate clinical decisions
with a very high level of factual backing, and it eliminates a good amount of uncertainty
about those decisions. However, even from a practical view, many other scientists and
physicians see some major issues with the approach. The main issues arise when one
examines the process of data appraisal and evidence application – neither is as
objective and factual as it originally seemed.
The general explanation of EBM and how it works ignores some fundamental
difficulties that arise in the practice, a major one being the process of appraising
evidence. Even if relevant data can be located on a given topic, the evaluation of the
efficacy of that data in the treatment of a specific condition is never as clear-cut
(Haynes et al.). There are several guides available that inform clinicians of how to
appraise data to determine its efficacy in different circumstances – guides that tell the
clinician when or why to use specific treatments covered in articles. Essentially, the
primary research articles require a further level of review before they become effective
in a lot of circumstances. As mentioned before, the practice of ‘clinical appraisal’ has
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also become popular, in which another level of uncertainty is added to already
uncertain data. The existence of these ‘middle men’ in data interpretation and
appraisal muddles the scientific rigor that may exist in the quantitative evidence.
Essentially, the practice of interpreting a quantitative data set for its application to a
qualitative, ever-changing scenario (as is the nature of the human body) is one that can
never be completely uninfluenced by some subjective ideology, no matter how sciencebased it may seem.
Furthermore, the complexity of a lot of therapeutic strategy is commonly
overlooked, and this results in articles simply being appraised as relevant without
further analysis into the nuances of the procedure. That is, even if an article is
appraised to be effective in a given circumstance, there are a plethora of nuanced
elements of medical procedures that may be overlooked or understated, either from the
perspective of the researcher or the practicing clinician (Naylor). When clinical
strategies are developed, there are usually several different technologies or techniques
involved. It is impossible to analyze each of these nuances individually – generally;
articles just give an overview of a clinical strategy without explaining the specific type of
technology, timing, sequence, etc. In other words, there are a huge number of variables
that cannot practically be controlled, especially when dealing with a human subject. So
even if an article is deemed as ‘effective’ for a certain situation, the actualization of that
treatment may not be in accordance with the original study’s protocol, which may cause
a different outcome.
Furthermore, the fact that a human being is the subject of the procedure makes
scientific rigor very difficult to uphold. There will not only be inevitable variables in the
way in which the procedure is carried out – there are also inevitable variables within
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the patient. There is no way, even conceptually, to control every bodily system in a
patient. When an original clinical study is carried out, the investigators can only
control for so much – age, gender, race and things of the like, along with certain
exclusion criteria. But those exclusion criteria are nothing more than an informed
guess about what may or may not get in the way of the therapy they are testing. A study
may proclaim, for instance, that a certain procedure on the lung is successful as long as
a patient does not have a certain type of heart condition. But what if certain liver
conditions also affect the efficacy of the procedure? If none of the patients in the study
had these liver conditions, the researchers would never know that there would be an
affect on the lung procedure. The point here is that the human body is extraordinarily
complex – quantifying it in any way is a very daunting task.
Clearly, there are some major problems with EBM, even when viewed from a
strictly scientific paradigm. But nonetheless, it does seem to have the potential to
become very effective if the level of scientific rigor in the medical community is
increased. If studies become clearer and protocols more exact, it should become the
ultimate way to practice biological medicine. But is this really so? The soundness of
the philosophical basis for the model is still left to be explored.
The notion of ‘evidence’ is one that has been somewhat unclear in the
philosophy of science during the twentieth century. In her article “On evidence and
evidence-based medicine: Lessons from the philosophy of science,” Maya Goldenberg
argues that the notion of evidence as ‘fact’ is an antiquated belief of the positivist
empiricist, and that this misunderstanding stands at the root of the inefficacy of EBM.
It does not occur to many people to question this issue – it seems, especially in modern
western culture – that a stronger correlation to ‘the evidence’ yields increasing
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certainty. In an age in which paradigmatic notions of the world are so unclear and
different, adhering to ‘evidence’ seems to serve as a universal notion that clarifies
between the correct and the incorrect with regard to all claims – referring to evidence
seems to be the way in which the scientific paradigm has come to permeate all aspects
of life. It seems, at least in the scientific community, that evidence serves as a god in a
godless world – it judges, it controls, it can be found in and through all things. In the
process of scientific inquiry, evidence is the judge of the good and the bad, the fact and
the rubbish. But is evidence really this all-powerful entity that it seems to be?
There are two major objections to the idea that evidence is effective as the basis
of scientific methodology. The first claim, held by both Kuhn and by Hanson, involves
the assertion that all observations, especially those made in a scientific context, are
inherently connected to an already-existing theory. It seems that much of the
empiricist epistemology of the early modern to modern era assumes that there is a
stable and unchanging relation between the external world and the perceiving subject.
Thinkers like Hume have made the assertion that the simple ideas that we hold in our
minds are ‘copies’ of the real things in the world – that they are accurate and clear
representations of them. But when we introduce the concept of naming, or language, it
becomes more difficult to clarify what the implications of this are. Wittgenstein’s duckrabbit serves as a useful example. Even if we see the image of the creature, and our
idea of that the creature really is a ‘copy’ of it, the way we name it, or conceptualize it, is
going to be muddled by something else – whether that is our own mind or some other
influence from the external world is not important. The point is that the route from an
image in the world to our verbal assertion about that image is not clear and direct.
There is plenty of room for error or some kind of influence – it doesn’t matter if one
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deems this subjective interpretation or something else. The point is clearly illustrated
by the duck-rabbit – one person might call it a duck, another will call it a rabbit.
Hence, two different observers may describe even a simple piece of evidence
differently.
And furthermore, scientific data interpretation is obviously never as simple as
naming a duck or a rabbit. The impressions (to use Hume’s terminology) that are
received in scientific inquiry are extremely complex – even Hume would agree that they
require a massive degree of mental synthesis, on behalf of the imagination, before one
could actually say anything about the impression. Obviously, this is a major problem
when it comes to a researcher’s assertion about evidence – using scientific terminology,
the relationship between quantitative data and an actual assertion about evidence is a
very complex one. The arguments made by Kuhn and Hanson assume that this is due
to a theoretical backing in the observer – they argue that it is a difference in the
perception of the subject. Again using Wittgenstein’s image, a scientist who studies
ducks will probably call the image a duck, while a scientist who studies rabbits will
deem it a rabbit. But regardless of the philosophical question about the root of the
distinction between the asserted ideas/evidence, there is no doubt that some confusion
exists.
The second major objection against evidence as the unquestionable root of
science is an elaboration on the previous idea, in a way. Both Duhem and Quine make
the claim that the connection between data and theory is always somehow interrupted
by an unwarranted subjective influence. That is, theory is not only derived directly
from data. It points to the fact that a single body of evidence can be used to suggest
multiple different scientific theories, depending on how it is interpreted by the
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researcher. It is noted that often times, scientists are left in a position where they have
to adopt one theory over another – this actually happens quite often in science. The
mere fact that one theory can be ‘believed’ by a scientist completely destroys the idea
that scientific theories can be utilized as factual. The adoption of any theory, especially
theories of medicine, is always predetermined by subjective biases. Hence, all scientific
studies involve subjective choices on behalf of the researchers. In the process of
interpreting the data, the investigator must make subjective judgments about the data
in order to turn it into evidence – no theory is solely based upon the external world.
To put succinctly, the first plight raises an issue with the connection between
phenomena in the world and our assertions about what those phenomena are. That is,
it raises an issue with the derivation of evidence from observation. The second plight
raises a further issue, claiming that theories are almost never sufficiently determined
by data, and that the decision to adopt one theory over another is usually a matter of
subjective choice. These two major issues exhibit the philosophical basis for the
previously discussed practical problems in EBM. It seemed at the outset that the
problem with evidence appraisal, application of theory and the complexity of the
human subject were problems that arose due to a lack of scientific rigor – that they
could be eliminated with stricter protocols and better methodology. But as it turns out,
there are inherent philosophical problems at their root. It seems that the
conceptualization of evidence as a representation of factual reality is misleading for
several reasons – the entire concept of basing medical practice solely on evidence is
flawed from the outset. But if we cannot use science alone to solve a scientific problem,
then what is to be done?
To recap, it was established that EBM is the type of medicine that is to be used to
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solve entirely biological problems – the type of medicine that increases the
functionality of the body alone, without treating the subject as whole. As stated, it
would seem that adhering to evidential findings would be the best approach to
addressing these types of issues. All other fields of science seem to use quantitative
research and statistical data analysis to derive evidence that will then be used to carry
on with a theory. But there is a fundamental difference between medical science and all
other types of science – in medical science, the end result is the sustenance of a human
life. The stakes are much higher in medicine.
To use an example, if a pharmaceutical company is investigating the efficacy of
an antibiotic for deadly bacteria, and their studies show that 90% of bacteria die when
treated with this agent, the drug is deemed effective. The 10% that lived are simply
deemed as outliers, and are never analyzed specifically. When that drug goes into
practice, if 90% of the people treated are cured, it is similarly considered successful in
the scientific community. But those 10% of people who were not cured cannot be
pushed aside as outliers like in the case of the bacteria. It is not only morally corrupt,
but impractical to quantify human life in the form of a statistic. Those unsuccessful
cases need to be examined thoroughly to investigate why and how the antibiotic didn’t
work – what it was about their body, specifically, that disallowed the efficacy of the
drug. For unlike the bacteria, each of those unsuccessful patient cases is just that – a
case. Each patient is viewed as an individual project, as a whole person, rather than an
insignificant component of a study. When a patient dies, there is a 100% failure –
blaming ‘uncontrolled variables’ for that failure is not acceptable. Those variables need
to be explored and discovered in order for a study to be deemed effective.
Clearly, the use of statistical data in medicine is far less useful than it would
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seem. Medicine requires much more than the application of faulty evidence proven by
questionable studies. The central problem with EBM is that it ignores the uniqueness
of the medical situation and the specific patient, even on the bodily level. Although
evidence may be used as a guiding element in practice, the idea that protocols can be
systematized and applied to people is impossible from a practical and philosophical
perspective. The answer to the problem, as I see it, lies in the recognition of the
individual body and the individual care provider. That is to say, the efficacy of
medicine does not only lie in the systematic approach – it really lies more in the
individual physician.
This is clearly exhibited in the field of surgery. In surgery, there are clear
protocols, evidentially supported methods, and physical skills that require fine-tuning.
A surgeon can be trained by the best educators and have impeccable skill with his
hands, while following a strongly evidentially supported procedure, and still make a
fatal mistake. But how can this happen? The answer, as I see it, lies in the ‘intangible’
element of medicine that is commonly overlooked due to its lack of scientific rigor –
intuition.
By intuition, I refer to the ability of an individual doctor to make decisions
without synthesizing sequential and clearly stated reasons. This may at first seem like
the opposite of what a good doctor does, but I argue that the concept is rooted in two
main things – the physician’s ability to think well, and the physician’s experience. The
ability to ‘think well’ is a term that I use instead of ‘decision making ability’ because I
think that the concept should be understood in a broader sense. What I mean by this is
that the thought processes behind the actual moment at which the decision is made in
the clinical setting should be acknowledged and emphasized. That is, it is not only the
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faculty of the mind that one would use in the event of a bleeding artery – the part of the
mind that would be presented with options and choose one – that makes a doctor
effective. It is more than this – the effective physician has very good memory and
forethought, among other things, so that each of his minute decisions can be precise
and thought-out. Furthermore, the effective physician will be able to focus on a task,
while still considering the totality of his situation. Hence, the mind must be strong in
its totality in order to deal with the specific nuances that will inevitably arise.
But in addition to a strong mind, the physician must also have extensive
experience to draw upon. Experience serves as the uncategorized knowledge base of
the physician that will contribute to his overall intuition – although he may not be able
to relate a decision to a specific study, the experienced physician will usually be able to
explain another nuanced case he saw that he finds similar and relevant. Although any
doctor can follow a large-scale procedure, only the one with a strong intuition will be
able to tackle the specific, nuanced problems or challenges that inevitably arise in the
practice of medicine. The intuitive physician is the one who will know how to deal with
an unusually formed physiological structure, or what to do when vitals change in
certain strange situations.
It’s important to note here that the philosophical objections to evidence also
apply to the experience of the doctor – all of his experiences are still subject to his own
interpretation. This is an inevitable fact in the world – all observations are subject to
some interpretation. However, what makes the use of ones own experience markedly
different than the use of another’s is the fact that it’s consistent. The central claim
made by Hanson and Kuhn is that all perceptions are affected by preexisting beliefs in
the subject, and hence, when a study is conducted and published, the way the scientist
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subjectively interprets the data is always swayed by his prior experience. The problem
that then results is that other doctors make further assumptions about the study, and
the way it was interpreted, and utilize it incorrectly – differently than the original
investigator intended it to be used. If the doctor relies most heavily upon his own
direct experience, there will always be a level of consistency with which he views
medical practice.
Similarly, if we emphasize the fact that the doctor is to rely more heavily upon
his own experience, the second issue starts to disappear as well. As long as the doctor
understands that he inevitably has a tendency in his analysis of different published
studies, he will not come to rely too heavily upon them – he will understand the fact
that his own experience is paramount to the experiences described by others. Hence,
the benefit of the individual’s application of his own experience is that it eliminates a
lot of steps in which the reality of the relevant experience can be lost. That is, the steps
involved in scientific procedure – or any conveyance of information, at that – are
always vulnerable to a loss of reality. Less subjective input will naturally yield a clearer
idea.
Nonetheless, no doctor can ever encounter every problem in every situation – an
evidence-backed basis for medicine does seem to be a useful piece to the overall
approach to care, as long as the doctor understands the limitations of evidence, and the
plethora of ways it can be obscured. However, we must not forget how important the
individual experience is – that in each specific case, it is the individual doctor who will
be addressing the individual patient. Hence, in the case of biological health, objectivity
can only really be approached when the inherent subjectivity of the situation is
embraced, rather than shunned.
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Alone, EBM is clearly not a sufficient paradigmatic approach to address
biological health. Surprisingly, even in addressing the strictly bodily, biological side of
health, it is still imperative to understand the individual body – and the individual
doctor – as individual. The influence of the subject, and the influence of individual,
cannot be avoided in medicine.
Before moving on, there are several conclusions that can be drawn from this
discussion. The first is that EBM has weak/flawed philosophical backing – it is a
systematic approach based on flawed steps. The second realization is that the patient is
an individual, and is unique in any and every circumstance. The patient cannot be
grouped with others or quantified if care is expected to be effective. A third realization
is that medicine cannot be systematized from the perspective of the provider – quality
and efficacy of care is always inherently related to the individual doctor.
So is everything about EBM complete nonsense? I would say no. The concept of
evidence can be used as a basis for an approach to the achievement of biological health,
but an overreliance or overconfidence in evidence is not only ineffective, but potentially
harmful to the patient. Systematizing/quantifying care according to set protocols is
based on an entirely flawed ideology. To clarify, research can be used to point
providers in the right direction, but it should never be used as the sole reason for a
clinical decision. While research does have the potential to suggest certain things about
a procedure, those suggestions should not be directly applied to the decision making
process. Telling someone that ‘this is what we do in this situation. Its protocol – it has
the highest success rate of all available procedures’ is unacceptable and useless.
I also think it’s important to note here that this is the part of medicine that rests
entirely upon the doctor – the part of the project that is undertaken after other
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philosophical decisions have been made about treatment. This will be addressed in the
future section on autonomy in the doctor/patient relationship – only the doctor should
make decisions of this kind. If a patient comes in and claims that they have ‘read about
a procedure’ and that they want it done, they are basing their decision on an entirely
flawed ideology. The doctor is the sole person who can make the types of decisions that
aim to achieve a predetermined goal, as he is the only one who has the relevant
experience to do so.

Patient Centered Medicine

In the previous discussion, one side of the project of medicine was explored –
the attempt to improve upon biological health. In the opening remarks, it was noted
that this side of health seeks to actualize a predetermined goal – to achieve an outcome
that has already been set. In accordance with our understanding of the project of the
physician, the determination of this outcome relates to the attempt to arrive at an
understanding of the relationship between overall Health and biological health.
Clearly, the EBM paradigm did not address this issue at all. The hope, therefore, is that
an exploration of this other major paradigm – PCM – will accomplish that goal. It
seems, according to the name, that patient centered medicine would explain the way in
which the subjective patient is incorporated and focused upon in medical practice.
However, defining the term ‘patient centered medicine’ actually turns out to be
an extremely difficult task – certainly more complicated and unclear than the defining
of EBM. In the literature about EBM, there is a clear, accurate and easily understood
definition. EBM truly is a way of practicing medicine in the western context, which
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strives to accomplish a clear-cut biological outcome. Although it is clearly flawed and
incomplete as a whole approach to medicine, there is a clear and well-understood idea
amongst doctors and philosophers of medicine alike of what it is, namely a strategic
approach to improving upon a person’s biological state through certain means.
The literature on PCM is quite different than the literature on EBM – there is a
significant amount of confusion regarding what the term actually refers to. Almost all
of the articles written on the subject define it in terms of what it is not, rather than what
it is. In most discussions, it is contrasted with disease-centered medicine or doctorcentered medicine, but it is rarely fully explained in and of itself. Jozien Bensing
presents a clear example of this tendency in his article, “Bridging the gap. The separate
worlds of evidence-based medicine and patient-centered medicine.” In defining PCM,
Bensing explicitly states that, “an illuminating way of [defining PCM] is by contrasting
the concept with its opposite” (p. 21), and then goes on to state that it can be defined as
the opposite of disease centered or the opposite of doctor centered. Even most
physicians adopt this method of defining PCM in terms of what it is not. In his article
in the New England Journal of Medicine, which is explicitly titled, “Defining ‘PatientCentered Medicine,’” Dr. Charles Bardes states that PCM strives to move away from the
purely biotechnical medical model, and also strives to establish a more ’equal’
relationship between the doctor and the patient – but neither of these ideas are
explicated. Rather, they are simply stated. Clearly, the general understanding of what
PCM actually refers to is usually quite vague.
However, it was possible to find one article that gave a fairly substantial
explanation of PCM, though I wouldn’t call it a definition. Dr. Moira Stewart gives five
criteria that describe the concept. The claim is that PCM does the following: “a)
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explores the patients’ main reason for the visit, concerns, and need for information; b)
seeks an integrated understanding of the patient’s world – that is, their whole person,
emotional needs, and life issues; c) finds common ground on what the problem is and
mutually agrees on management; d) enhances prevention and health promotion; and e)
enhances the continuing relationship between the patient and the doctor” (p. 445).
In reviewing both descriptions of PCM – both Stewart’s description and the
opposite-oriented description of Bardes and Bensing – these concepts seem quite
familiar. It becomes clear that PCM simply describes a way of thinking about medicine
itself – a way that was just described in its totality. All of these attitudes about
medicine seem to be practical implications of our conception of the actual project of
medicine. Essentially, the term ‘patient centered medicine’ just describes the kind of
medicine that would be practiced by our ideal doctor. Unlike EBM, a doctor can’t really
practice PCM – they can agree with it or adopt the ideas of it, but as stated, it is really
more of an attitude about medicine than an approach to practicing medicine. While
discussions surrounding PCM do contain some useful ideas about health and medicine,
none of them explicitly address how the doctor is to actualize these goals, or what the
ideas really mean.
So, where does this leave us in the greater scheme of the project? If PCM doesn’t
serve as a way for the doctor to reconcile biological health with overall Health in the
patient, then where are we to turn?
It seems that a reexamination of the ways PCM is described may shed some light
on the issue. As stated, PCM is always characterized in terms of holistic health and a
more patient-controlled clinical setting. Obviously, the first of these two issues has
been extensively explored. But the second has not – the question of the relationship.
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In searching for a practical way to determine each individual’s conception of being, it
was misguided to look at a medical paradigm in order to derive how to do so. In reality,
it is the subject-subject interaction between the patient and doctor that must be
examined in order to explore the way by which the doctor can explore the patient’s
notions of biological health and overall Health.
And this does seem to make sense, in light of the discussion of EBM. It became
quite clear that the individuality of each clinical encounter is something that cannot be
systematized or fully explained by a single paradigm. Rather, each clinical interaction
needs to be examined individually. For the sake of improving biological health, this
individuality is important insofar as it recognizes the uniqueness of each patient’s body.
In order to embrace individuality from this perspective, the important thing was to
understand the fact that each patient has a different biological/physiological structure.
But in order to embrace the individuality of the patient in an attempt to establish a
notion of overall Health, and to make biological decisions in light of that, it only makes
sense that the doctor patient interaction is examined beyond the physical level.
Hence, the assumption that EBM and PCM were going to be two components of
medicine that are to coincide in order to achieve full and effective medicine was wrong.
Rather, one component of medicine is based on biological manipulation, which is to be
achieved through the means discussed in the section on EBM, which strives to improve
the biological side of a person’s being. The other side is entirely based on the
relationship – a systematic approach or ‘paradigm’ cannot achieve something so
specific and individualistic. In order to realize a person’s notion of being, a one-on-one
interaction between two people must take place. And that is what will be examined in
the following section.
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Section 4: Models for the Clinical Interaction
Through most of the previous discussion, it has become clear that the project of
the physician, as a whole, can only be understood in terms of each individual clinical
interaction between the doctor and the patient. Furthermore, it has become clear that
any attempt to objectively systematize medicine is not only ineffective, but also
dangerous, as seen in the case of the pure evidence based medical paradigm. Even
from a biological perspective, the individuality of the patient’s situation always has to
be taken into account – every medical decision must occur by means of a specific
analysis of the unique case at hand. That is, cases are not to be thought of or described
as a case of x or y, but rather the case. So, prior to any assertions about subjectivity or
the actual relationship, the specific clinical encounter is still to be valued in terms of
absolute importance in the project of medicine. As we have come to see, it really is
impossible, or at lease useless, to discuss medicine without discussing the specific
clinical interaction.
In this section, the specific nature of that clinical interaction will be explored in
light of the previous discussion on health and being, in order to determine the nature of
the most effective clinical interaction. Referring to the previously proposed model of
overall health, we will attempt to isolate and identify a specific kind of clinical
interaction in which the patient’s own notion of holistic Health can be most readily and
effectively brought to light, so that decisions about biological health can be made
effectively.
Before starting the discussion, I find it important to clarify the use of the term
‘relationship.’ Soon after considering the clinical interaction, it seems to become
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imperative to discuss the relationship between the doctor and patient. But this is not
necessarily the best way to understand the interaction. The term ‘relationship’ already
implies a certain kind of interaction between doctor and patient. And although our
previous discussion of health, and the nature of health and being, would suggest that
the interaction must develop into a relationship, it is not the case that all ways of
conceptualizing the clinical interaction involve a relationship in the full sense of the
word. Using the term relationship implies that there is a meaningful connection
between two people, but in some ways of conceptualizing the clinical setting, this
meaningful connection does not come to exist.
At the outset of the discussion, we are left with a major question that must be
addressed before we can start – how are we to classify different kinds of medical
interactions? With some thought, one issue emerges as the preeminent feature used to
classify many interpersonal interactions, especially ones that center around a decision
making process involving two individuals – the issue of power. And because of the
specific aforementioned nature of the clinical interaction, namely that it inherently
involves a decision making process, the question of power can be considered
synonymous with the more specific question of autonomy.
Autonomy really is the central feature of any interaction that involves a mutual
decision between two people – the interaction cannot be thought of without it, and it is
the ultimate feature that will decide how decisions are made. The importance of
autonomy in any interaction is elucidated when one considers government – all
governments are classified according to the level of autonomy amongst the ruling
versus the ruled. It makes sense that the clinical interaction is almost always
conceptualized and organized in the literature according to this concept of autonomy.
62

	
  
Hence, an examination of autonomy in the relationship will serve as the first step
towards identifying the nature of the most effective clinical interaction, and as a way of
organizing or dividing clinical interactions into kinds.
It is also important to note that each of these models results in a different notion
of health, by its nature. That is, as autonomy changes, so does the functional notion of
health. This movement will not be linear through the discussion. Rather, the health
conceptualization will be more objective and biologically-rooted in the models where
autonomy is one-sided (the first and last model), and will be more subjective and
holistic where the autonomy is shared. This will turn out to be a major factor in
determining which model is most effective.
In order to explore this concept of autonomy in the interaction, we will explore
five different ideal models of the clinical setting. In the discussion, we will move from a
model in which the physician dominates the autonomy towards one in which the
patient is mainly autonomous. It is to be noted that these models may have different
names in the literature, or may be described slightly differently by different authors,
but there are commonly four major models that describe the main categories for kinds
of autonomous medical interactions. I’ve decided to include an extra, less common
model because it serves as a useful middle ground between the two sides (patientcontrolled and doctor controlled). The five models, moving from doctor as autonomous
to patient as autonomous, are9:

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
9	
  Emanuel and Emanuel provide a very clear and concise explanation of the models of
the relationship – this is the model that the discussion will largely be based off of, as it
has been widely accepted in the medical community as a valid representation of the
clinical interaction. Childress and Siegler also provide some useful insight as to how
these models can be understood.	
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1. The paternalistic/parental/priestly model
2. The deliberative/friendship model
3. The negotiation model
4. The interpretive/partnership model
5. The informative/engineering model

The Paternalistic Model

The paternalistic model of medicine, also called parental or priestly, is the classic
way of conceptualizing the interaction between doctor and patient. Although the name
seems to suggest that this model is inherently based on a relationship, this is ironically
one of the interaction models that I find very non-relationship based. In this classic
model, the doctor serves as the absolute controller of the decision making process – the
physician, as expert, makes decisions according to an objective set of medical values,
and the patient is to respect those decisions and follow the doctor’s orders. It is
expected that the patient will consent to “the physician’s determination of what’s best”
(Emanuel and Emanuel, p. 2221). Because health value is seen as objective and
absolute, it is only the physician who can make the best decisions regarding health – he
is to use his expertise and training in order to isolate a problem and come up with the
best solution. Clearly, this model does not rely on much patient input at all. The
patient’s only job in the interaction is to objectively inform the physician of his
symptoms. Decisions about treatment are made without any subjective influence from
the patient – the patient’s role is simply to carry out the doctor’s instructions as
precisely as possible.
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Under the paternalistic model, the interaction between doctor and patient does
not leave room for the generation of a meaningful relationship. But if the interaction
were to be conceptualized in terms of a relationship, I think the model of the father or
priest with son or worshipper is misguided to describe it. The interaction does seem to
be paternal or priestly in that the patient must have absolute trust and reverence
towards the physician, as in the case of the father or priest, but the suggesting of a
father/child relationship implies more than just one of reverence and order following.
The so-called paternalistic model of the interaction does not entail the nuances of the
relationship between a father and his child. There is no implication of mutual care or
empathy, nor is there any sort of meaningful communication that takes place. Hence, I
think it would be more useful to think of this type of interaction as the kind between a
soldier and his commanding officer. The soldier respects the knowledge and capability
of his commanding officer, and takes orders from him without inputting any subjective
influence. This seems to be more representative of the way the patient and doctor
interact in the paternalistic model – it is cold and objective, and does not rely on a close
relationship in the full sense.

The Deliberative Model

The movement from the paternalistic model to the deliberative model
constitutes a large shift in the way the interaction works. The patient’s influence is
introduced in this model, but the doctor still retains a good share of autonomy in the
relationship. In the deliberative model, the doctor informs the patient of the totality of
their clinical situation, and seeks to persuade the patient to make decisions that he (the
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physician) deems best. In order to do so, the physician must fully explain the situation
to the patient, taking into account all of the subjective criteria that may be at stake. The
doctor must have an informed conversation with the patient in order to identify what
goals would seem best in this specific instance for this specific patient.
This model of the interaction acknowledges the fact that health is not an
objective, universally understood issue. A conception of health is explored, given the
situation, according to the specific ongoing in a patient’s life. However, in the
deliberative interaction, the doctor ultimately seeks to make a final decision on what he
thinks is the right option in terms of decision making. Although he does take the
subject into account in the process of deciding, the doctor will ultimately try to
persuade the patient to make one decision over another – this model seems to open
health to some subjectivity, but it still holds on to the objective health value of the
paternalistic model. It is often noted that decisions ultimately belong to the patient,
and that coercion is to be avoided, but the doctor still makes a clear and strong effort to
inform the patient of what to do – the doctor seems to have an attitude that he knows
the true objective nature of health, but that he doesn’t have the right to impose that
notion on the patient.
In the deliberative model, there is definitely a strong relationship developed
between physician and patient. Although that relationship is often characterized as
friendship, I think it is more useful to characterize this model as paternalistic – or
maybe motherly – but between a parent and an adult offspring. The relationship here
is very intense, and extensive communication takes place in the interaction, leading to
the development of a strong relationship. But what makes it parental, to me, is the fact
that the doctor still believes that he ‘knows best’ for the patient, just as the parent
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always thinks that he or she knows what is best for the child. Illuminating the model in
this way seems to make it a bit less mutual, at least ideologically. Even though the
patient has the final say on what he or she is to do with his or her health, the attempt by
the physician to tell him or her what he should do seems to be an imposition, similar to
the way the mother and father seem to impose on the decision making process of their
adult child. Just as the child of the parent will assert that he is an adult, and that he
knows what is best for his own life, it seems that the patient would, or should, do the
same. This will be discussed in more depth in the discussion.

The Negotiation Model

The negotiation model is rather uncommon and unorthodox – it is put forth by
Childress and Siegler as a way of ‘leveling the playing field,’ as it were, between the
physician and patient. That is, it seeks to generate a model of medicine in which
neither doctor nor patient is autonomous. In this model, it is assumed that the doctor
and patient may both have their own individual interests – just as a patient may have a
presupposed notion of health, the doctor may have one as well. In these
circumstances, according to the negotiation model, neither party has to submit to the
assertions of the other. Rather, the two should have a conversation in which they both
put forward their view, and come to a mutual decision on a hybrid version of the overall
decision. Hence, this model acknowledges the subjectivity involved in any
understanding of health, but does not seek to put either the doctor or the patient in the
right.
In order to come to a mutually agreeable decision, the doctor and patient would
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both be required to put forth the entirety of their idea of health, and propose an
argument for their understanding of the current situation. Interestingly, Childress and
Sielger believe this to be especially effective because it allows for notions of health to
change and evolve over time. It seems that this model is an attempt to acknowledge
how unique each clinical interaction is – rather than setting a standard way of viewing
autonomy, it is proposed that the autonomy can and should shift according to the
specific situation. In other words, the relationship between the doctor and patient can
be controlled by the doctor in some instances, and by the patient in others. It is a
model that does not tie autonomy to either party, but rather conceptualizes the
relationship in terms of a constant flux of autonomy from one interaction to another.
By acknowledging this movement from interaction to interaction, the negotiation
model seems to bridge the gap between the two parties. But whether or not this model
is effectively useful will be discussed in more detail later in the discussion.

The Interpretive Model

The interpretive model, as I see it, seems to be a slightly more patient-controlled
version of the deliberative model. In the interpretive model, the physician still seeks to
help the patient identify a specific notion of health within the context of the situation at
hand, and help the patient come to a decision regarding these matters. It is the job of
the physician, according to this model, to elucidate the medical issues clearly, so that
the patient can fully understand the situation, and to engage in a conversation with the
patient in order to bring the patient’s own understanding of the issue to light.
Similarly, the physician will seek to identify a set of goals with regard to any given
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condition, taking the subjective will of the patient into account. Unlike the deliberative
physician, however, the interpretive physician stops there – there is no attempt to
persuade the patient to make one decision over another, regardless of the physician’s
own inclinations or beliefs.
Clearly, the interpretive physician realizes the subjective nature of health. But
unlike the deliberative physician, the interpretive physician does not believe that he is
to impose on an understanding of health. That is, the interpretive physician views
health as an entirely subjective notion, while the deliberative physician views health as
somewhat subjective, but still retaining some form of objective value. Because of this
belief, the interpretive physician will only seek to elucidate a notion of health within the
patient – it is accepted that often times, health is not a clear cut issue, and it requires a
fair amount of clarification and discussion before one can arrive at an absolute
understanding of what one thinks is best with regards to health decisions.
The interpretive model of the interaction is, like the deliberative, inherently
based on a relationship – it is only through intimate conversation that the physician
can help the patient arrive at a full and acceptable notion of health. To me, this model
is the one that should be characterized by friendship, although Emanuel and Emanuel
characterize it as a partnership or a relationship between advisor and advisee. The two
thinkers take the physician’s lack of effort to input his own subjective belief as a lack of
care on behalf of the physician, in that one may conceptualize the physician as ‘allowing
the patient to make a bad decision.’ But I think this is very misguided – with a more
full understanding of health, it is clearly acknowledged that subjectivity in these
decisions must be embraced in their entirety, though this will be discussed later in
detail. In my view, the interpretive model is more representative of a friendship than
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any other model – it stresses mutual respect and mutual care. According to Childress
and Siegler’s account, the friendship model is similar to the deliberative model, but it is
different in that it “stresses the intensity of the relationship” (p.21). The doctor shows
respect for the patient’s autonomy, while the patient shows respect for the doctor’s
ability to describe the situation and help them arrive at a notion of being, even though
the patient has the ultimate say on the course of his or her treatment.

The Informative Model

In terms of autonomy, the informative model represents the opposite of the
paternalistic model – it is a conception of the interaction that gives the patient absolute
autonomy in the decision making process, severely limiting the role of the physician.
Other ways of describing this model are as technician or engineer’s model, viewing the
physician as an expert in human biological systems. In the informative model, the
physician simply analyzes the patient and gives him or her information regarding the
situation at hand – the patient then makes decisions according to the objective criteria
put forth by the physician. In no way does the physician have any influence in the
decisions that are made – the job of the physician is simply to inform the patient what
the situation is, and what possible treatments there are. As stated by Emanuel and
Emanuel, “There is no role for the physician’s values, the physician’s understanding of
the patient’s values, or his or her worth of the patient’s values” (p.2221).
The model adopts an interesting, yet somewhat confusing, notion of health. In
one sense, the physician is understood as a biological expert, and nothing more. That
is, the physician is nothing more than a textbook – simply explaining certain biological
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conditions, options for procedures, and statistical outcomes. In this sense, health
seems entirely objective and biological. But on the other hand, the patient is the one
who ultimately decides what to do. This seems to go against the objective notion of
health – understanding health as biological and objective, it would seem that the
patient would rely on the doctor to choose the best procedure. The fact that the patient
ultimately decides on what to be done seems to suggest that health is more subjective,
but that the physician is not to be involved in the generation of health itself.
It is unclear what notion of health is adopted here. On one hand, it seems that
health is to be understood as objective, but that the patient is making the assertion that
he or she is just as competent as the physician in the process of identifying effective
procedures to achieve that objective goal. But on the other hand, it seems that the
patient may be asserting that the physician is not to be involved in the notion of health
– that health is entirely subjective, and that it is only the doctor’s job to give
information about a person’s biology, not to help them develop health in any way but a
physical one. The first of these two possibilities seems to be misinformed and
somewhat silly – there is no way that a patient could make decisions about their
objective biological condition more effectively than someone who does it for a living.
And the second possibility seems to make sense, but to be somewhat overconfident in
its ideology. That is, it is possible for someone to think that they don’t need the
doctor’s input in the attempt to identify health values in given situations. If this were
the case, it seems that this model diminishes the conceived role of the physician, but
does not move toward an objective notion of health.
Regardless, conceptualizing the interaction in these terms clearly leads to a
situation that is as sterile and cold, if not more sterile and cold, than the one generated
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in the paternalistic model. There seems to be no relationship here at all – this notion of
the physician is no different than a computer. The patient retains all autonomy – there
is none to be shared.

Discussion

In light of our previous discussion on health, the efficacy of some of these
models is fairly easy to judge. The paternalistic model, to start with, is clearly
ineffective in achieving a whole notion of health. It completely disregards the idea that
the patient has to realize his or her own notion of Health and being before any medical
decision can be made, drawing on the false assumption that Health, as a whole, is
strictly biological. The paternalistic model seems to be the one used by physicians who
rely solely on EBM, viewing conclusions drawn from research and statistical
observations as dogmatic ways of representing how to achieve health. It is this model
that much of the ‘PCM’ movement is rallying against – many view this model as an
unacknowledged infringement on patient rights, and assert that overly aggressive
assertion by the doctor is unethical (Goodyear-Smith and Buetow).
The informative model is also quite troubling, though for a different reason. The
interpretive model completely skews the conception of medicine that we’ve been
working toward. The model relies on a very unclear idea of health, and completely
devalues the importance of the physician’s role in medicine. Furthermore, it ignores the
fact that the physician is the only one who can most effectively make decisions
regarding biological health. That is, even if a person came in with a clear and wellthought out understanding of their life and what it is to be in good Health, there is no
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way that the patient would be able to effectively align that notion with a medical
procedure (at least in many circumstances). That is, even if someone comes in without
a doubt in their mind as to what their own subjective notion of Health is, if he or she is
confronted with the decision to choose between complex procedures. There will still be
a necessary conversation that would occur between the doctor and patient with regards
to the alignment of that notion with the outcomes of the procedures.
In other words, there is no way that a patient could immediately learn
everything about a single procedure based on objective information. Medical
procedures are extremely complicated and nuanced – the doctor’s input is absolutely
necessary in the attempt to clarify and elucidate the way in which outcomes will affect
each individual. Hence, it is not realistic to call the model ‘purely informative’ – there
may be cases in which an interaction can be informative (you have an infection – you
can take antibiotic A or B), but any complex clinical situation necessarily requires a
more detailed and nuanced conversation. That is, even the patient who ‘believes in’ the
informative model will enter the realm of the interpretive model in a more complex
situation.
The deliberative model seems to be quite close to an effective way of actualizing
our notion of health. Many scholars, including Emanuel and Emanuel, support this
model as one that embraces mutual autonomy most effectively. The model has been
conceptualized as a way to give the patient their fair share of control in the interaction,
while still retaining the understanding that the physician is ultimately the professional
(Chin). In keeping the ‘benefits’ of paternalism – namely, an assertion that health goals
should entail some ‘objectivity’ – the ‘integrity’ of medicine stays in tact. But in the
acknowledgment of the individuality of the patient, the specific case is examined,
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taking the whole situation of the subject into account. In this sense, the deliberative
model seems to expand a notion of health, while holding on to some objective basis.
Although I think the deliberative model is a movement in the right direction, as
it were, I don’t think it does so in a particularly useful way. It seems that this model
acknowledges that there is some sort of duality that goes on in our conception of
medicine, but does not do enough to elucidate just what that duality is. That is, the
deliberative model seems to lack philosophical basis. It ignores the necessity to
examine the nature of that confusing fragmentation in our overall understanding of
Health, and because of this, the solution is not very well thought out – it seems that the
assertion is simply that there should be something objective, at least in some way,
about health, but that it is also subjective, in some other way. The way the deliberative
model goes about reconciling this confusion is by simply addressing the ideas of
physician and patient as different in some way, assuming that the physician knows the
objective side of health while the patient knows the subjective side. Clearly, as
discussed in the section on health, the distinction is not so simple.
The interpretive model seems to make the same mistake, though I believe this
model comes closest to addressing health as we have conceived it. The interpretive
model stresses the importance of a realization of the notion of health by the patient,
and also stresses the importance of the physician in accomplishing this. At first glance,
it seems that the interpretive physician does exactly what we’ve asserted the physician
is supposed to do – elucidate a personal notion of Health – and this is true. But once
again, the lack of a clear definition of health leads to a shortcoming. Although the
physician can effectively arrive at a notion of Health through this model, it is not so
clear that he can actually improve the biological side of health through this model. The
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way it is described by Emanuel and Emanuel, the informative model leaves the
physician in a place where he has almost no say in the deliberation process. That is,
although the informative physician will do an admirable job of allowing his patient to
come to their own subjective understanding of biological health and overall Health, he
also allows them total license in choosing a medical procedure – he has no input at all.
This does not seem right, given the previous discussion of EBM – the doctor must have
input in choosing the actual course of action, while basing this off of the patient’s
conception of Health.
This central flaw (the lack of doctor autonomy in choosing actual medical
procedures) can be viewed, in a way, as the other side of the deliberative model’s
central flaw. It seems that the deliberative model wants to suggest that the physician is
the only one who knows best in terms of the improvement of biological health, but that
it ignores the fact that the patient’s notions are central – not the physician’s. Speaking
of our preconceived notion of health, it seems that the deliberative model is able to
improve upon biological health most effectively, but that the informative model is able
to generate more useful medical decisions based on a whole conception of Health.
There must be some way to reconcile these two models, drawing the beneficial
parts from each. And in order to do so, we have to return to the central notion of
autonomy. It seems to me that a fundamental flaw in the analysis or description of
these models in the literature is that it ignores the fact that there are different parts to
the clinical interaction. Once this is understood, one doesn’t have to label the overall
interaction in terms of autonomy, but rather, parts of the interaction. It seems that the
negotiation model made a good move in attempting to assert that each individual
interaction must vary, even between the same physician and patient – but I seek to take
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this one step further, and assert that each part of the interaction must vary in terms of
autonomy.
I think the nature of decision-making needs to be more closely examined in
order to elucidate these different parts. Every decision involves two fundamental steps.
The first step is the realization of a desired outcome, and the second is an action that
strives to achieve that outcome. In terms of medicine, the realization of the desired
outcome is obviously the process by which one comes to understand their own notion
of Health, and hence their notion of biological health. The action that strives to achieve
that notion of health is the actual medical procedure. Understanding the decision
making process in this way, it becomes clear that the patient holds the autonomy in the
process of defining their notion of Health, but that the physician holds autonomy in
deciding on how to achieve that goal, or in other words, the physician should have the
final say on the actual medical procedure. Hence, the deliberative model is flawed in its
assertion that the doctor should influence the patient’s actual understanding of health,
but the interpretive model is flawed in its assertion that the physician shouldn’t have
autonomy in the process of choosing a procedure.
Now, this is not to say that the autonomy is to be held in full in each of the
respective parts of the decision making process. There obviously can, and will, be ways
in which the doctor is involved in the derivation of the notion of being, and similarly
ways in which the patient is involved in the choosing of a procedure. But this crossinvolvement should be limited, and should respect the autonomy of the other. For
instance, the doctor may prod or ask questions in order to elucidate a notion of being,
and at the same time, a patient can voice concerns about different procedures for
different reasons. But in each of these cases, it should be done with a level of respect
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for the other – the doctor must acknowledge that the patient is an expert on his or her
life, and at the same time, the patient must acknowledge that the doctor is an expert on
medical practice. To clarify, it should never be the case that the doctor makes a blatant
assertion about what the patient should want. And similarly, the patient should never
tell the doctor which procedure is best for their desired outcome.
It is this model that serves as the most effective – one that acknowledges the
dual nature of the decision-making process, and does not try to attribute all autonomy
in the interaction to one party. Clearly, the patient and the doctor are both experts,
albeit on very different topics. The two must recognize and respect their positions in
the interaction, and respect each other’s level of expertise. Through this understanding
of the clinical interaction, the doctor will ultimately be ale to achieve the goal – by
effectively communicating with each patient on an individual basis, while maintaining
this firm understanding of the way the autonomy is to be distributed in the interaction,
the doctor will be able to make confident medical decisions that are soundly rooted in
the individual patient’s own understanding of Health.
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Conclusion
Arriving at the end of the Section 4, it seems that both major goals of this project
have finally been realized. It is hopefully clear by now that Part I was successful in
defining the telos of the physician in medical practice. To clarify one last time, it was
decided that the two major aspects of the physician’s role are 1) to come to a specific
understanding of the way each patient conceptualizes the interplay between biological
health and overall Health (or in other words, attempt to understand the patient’s
overall conception of being), and 2) to improve upon the biological health of their
patient. In addition, the physician is to remember that his ultimate goal is to establish
overall Health, and he is to do whatever he can to accomplish that goal.
Part II was also rather successful in establishing the answer to the ‘how’
question. It was concluded that in order to most effectively realize a subjective notion
of Health in the patient, the doctor must address each patient as a free-thinking
subject, while keeping a clear understanding of the way the relationship and decision
making process is supposed to work. Furthermore, in order to improve upon biological
health in the patient, it was made clear that the doctor must always remember the
individuality of his patient, must rely on his own intuition above all else, and must
never blindly adhere to a systematic approach to medicine.
According to the outline of the paper in the introduction, the project was
definitely successful – a description of medicine’s telos, as well as a description of the
way the doctor is to actualize that goal, has been formulated. Clearly, this was the goal
of the paper. But looking back, if we delve beyond the content of the text, and towards
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the actual movement that was made in order to come to these assertions, an even more
interesting conclusion comes to light.
At the outset, we began by examining several preexisting notions of what it
means to be healthy. We delved into the assertions of different scientists and
philosophers, referencing different books and articles, in an attempt to learn from
others. We gathered as much knowledge about health as we could, in an attempt to
come to know what medicine is. Different assertions were made about the ideas – we
agreed with some, disagreed with others. But regardless, the object of the first section
was to establish a knowledge base upon which we could build the rest of our project.
In the second section, we reexamined that entire knowledge base – the
assertions made in the previous section were scrutinized and analyzed. We grappled
with the different concepts that we had just learned about in an attempt to make our
own idea – to come to understand what was really going on beyond the academic
debate. Despite all we learned, we made a strong attempt to come to our own
understanding, thinking beyond what had already been stated.
In the third section, we began our search for the correct way to practice – the
best system of medicine. But in each of the two, we found some fatal flaws. It seemed
that there was no way to accept a single, structured paradigm. Clearly, systematized
medical practice was detrimental and useless. Nonetheless, we learned a good amount
from the flaws of the ideology before moving away from the systematic and towards the
individualistic.
Within the analysis of the clinical setting, it quickly became clear that a positive
relationship between doctor and patient was absolutely paramount to good medical
practice. Although we came to understand the general attitude that the doctor must
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have in the clinical setting, the nuanced skills – the ways by which the doctor can
actualize his goal – are still left to be explored. This part of the ‘how’ question seems
impossible to answer in full – there can always be another way for the doctor to do his
job better, both in terms of biological health and in terms of his generating a notion of
holistic Health.
Clearly, this was originally intended to be an external philosophical analysis of
the way medicine works. But looking back upon the project, it seems that it became
more than just an external inquiry – it seems to have become a kind of
phenomenological experience. That is, the education that we received in the movement
through this paper can be seen as a direct analogue to the way a reflective doctor
should move through his education and career.
The first section can be seen as analogous to the physician’s experience in
medical school, starting from scratch, examining the theories of others in order to build
up a knowledge base, which could be used for the rest of his project in medicine.
The second section can be seen as the physician’s attempt to sort through the
different theories and notions that he learned in school in order to come up with his
own conception of what medicine really is. In this stage of his career, the physician
seeks to establish a true basis of his project, based on all of the knowledge acquired in
school, just as we attempted to find greater meaning in these preexisting notions of
health.
The third section can be seen as the physician’s experience in residency – the
physician enters the practical realm, and into a structured system of medicine that
relies upon hierarchy and protocol, just as we entered the realm of medical paradigms
which were similarly structured. Just as we did in the discussion, the reflective
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physician will ultimately realize the inadequacy of the system. Through his experience,
the physician will come to realize the importance of the individual clinical interaction.
Section four can be seen as the physician’s movement away from the
systematization of the residency experience and towards a more individualistic kind of
clinical medicine. As we did in the movement through this section, the physician will
ultimately come to realize the best way to interact with his patients. Furthermore, he
will come to realize that he can always improve upon his project, just as we realize that
we can always expand upon this paper.
The reason why this parallelism is so important is because it shows just how
much philosophical thought the field of medicine demands of the physician. In order
to be a truly adequate physician, one must never stop examining his situation, never
stop questioning his teachings, and never stop asking which elements about his
practice are good, and which are bad. Only the reflective physician can be a decent
physician, regardless of technical skill or training. The ability to think deeply and
reflectively is a fundamental attribute of any good physician – and it is a quality that
the physician must never lose. Regardless of technological advancement, we cannot
forget that the field of medicine deals with the fundamental element of humanity –
being. The physician truly is an ontologist, and he must recognize himself as such.
In conclusion, if nothing else is taken away from this project, it is my hope that
the reader has realized one fundamental reality: we must think philosophically about
medicine. Throughout this project, it has not been my intention to lead the western
world to an enlightened understanding of the entire field of medicine, nor has it been
my goal to make a groundbreaking assertion about ontology or intersubjectivity. The
content of the paper is certainly important, in that it raises questions and concerns, and
81

	
  
makes a few suggestions about medicine. But even if the reader disagrees with every
claim I’ve made in the text, I hope that he or she will still recognize – by the simple
process of reading through this paper – that medicine is necessarily more than just
science or technology, and demands an immense amount of thought, both from the
behalf of the physician and the patient. In dealing with the lives – the Being – of
individuals, the project of medicine must be thoughtfully reflected upon incessantly.
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